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ABSTRACT
THE IMPACTS OF IN-STATE PROCUREMENT PREFERENCE 
POLICIES ON THE ECONOMY OF SOUTH CAROLINA
Sawsan A. Abutabenjeh, 2014 
Old Dominion University 
Director: Professor Berhanu Mengistu
This research examined the impact of South Carolina's in-state preference 
policies on the economy of the state. To achieve this purpose, the research sought to 
answer the question: what are the impacts of implementing the in-state procurement 
preference policies on the economy of the state of South Carolina? The question was 
answered by using seven economic indicators: jobs, personal income, real disposable 
income, output (sales), Gross State Product (GSP), value added and state's population. 
The data related to the in-state preference policies were collected from the South 
Carolina Procurement Services Office. The data was then analyzed using the Regional 
Economic Model Policy Insight (REMI PI+) for economic-forecasting and policy-analysis.
The results revealed the existence of quantitative differences between the 
baseline, which represents the values of the economic indicators without implementing 
the preference policies, and the alternative forecast, which represents the values of the 
economic indicators when implementing the policies. Specifically, the results showed 
that implementing in-state preference policies presented economic benefits to the state 
and its communities in the form of additional jobs, income, GSP, value added, 
population and sales. From 2010 until 2017, the total economic impact of implementing 
preference policies generated $17 million in total output, 135 total job- years, $10.22
million in GSP, $10.27 million in value added, $7.52 in income and $5.14 million in real 
disposable personal income. The impact on the wholesale trade industry was over $5 
million in total industry output and approximately 27 jobs. The manufacturing sector 
had a total impact of over $4 million in total industry output and approximately 17 jobs. 
The impact on the construction industry was approximately $3 million in total industry 
output and approximately 30 jobs. Over 100 people were predicted to relocate to the 
state within the next 8 years. Although the values of the economic indicators are very 
small compared to the size of the state economy, they outweighed the direct cost of 
preferences. The direct cost of preferences represents the extra dollars that 
government pays when they award the contracts based on preferences. Overall, 
implementing the in-state preference policies contributed to South Carolina's economy 
However, further research is warranted to account for the total costs of implementing 
the preference policies.
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For much of the twentieth century, public procurement has been used as a 
policy tool to achieve various political, economic, and social objectives (Martin, 1996; 
McCrudden, 2007; Pitzer & Thai, 2009; Rolfstam, 2008; Thai, 2001). Policy makers have 
made federal, state, and local government procurement officials responsible for the 
implementation of a variety of procurement policies not related to what they are 
seeking to acquire in a particular procurement. Procurement officials in many states 
have been required to grant preferences to in-state suppliers and/or goods and services 
produced within the boundaries of the state's jurisdiction (McCrudden, 2007; Qiao,
Thai, & Cummings, 2009); these policies are hereafter referred to as in-state preference 
policies, and they are the focus of this research.
The primary purpose of in-state preferences is to create economic opportunity 
for in-state businesses by protecting them from out-of-jurisdiction competitors and to 
encourage them to engage in productive economic activities for the benefit of their 
state's economy and its residents as a whole (Hefner, 1996; Krasnokutskaya 8i Seim, 
2008; McCrudden, 2007; Moreland, 2012; Qiao et al., 2009). In the literature, there is a 
lack of studies to document the economic benefits of the in-state preference policies, 
and this creates a significant gap, which this researcher aims to begin the process of 
filling.
1
The purpose of this study is to lay a foundation for the investigation of the 
economic impacts of in-state preference policies on the economy of a single state, 
namely, South Carolina. This chapter introduces the nature of the research by providing 
background information, stating the problem, and explaining the purpose and the 
significance of the research. Following this, the research question, the methodology, 
and the assumptions are presented. The last part of this chapter describes the 
limitations of the research.
Background
Government has always used its purchasing power to achieve particular 
economic, social and political objectives (Qiao et al., 2009). The literature shows that 
procurement policies are used to create employment opportunities, to provide fair 
payment to vendors and employees, to promote conditions conducive to working, as 
well as to protect the environment (Pitzer & Thai, 2009). Studies further reveal that 
public procurement also has been used to provide preference to local vendors, small 
businesses, and women and minority owned businesses. As a whole, the variety of 
policies through which policy makers seek to grant an advantage to specified categories 
of vendors -  no matter the basis for granting the preference in a particular instance - 
falls under the umbrella of procurement preference policies.
The literature points to the existence of two broad categories of procurement 
preference policies: those based on geographical preference laws and those based on 
non-geographical preference laws (Qiao et al., 2009; Short, 1992). Geographical
2
preferences are based on the "geographical location" of a vendor or where a product or 
a service is "produced" or construction is performed. Representative of these policies 
based on geographical location are the Buy American Act at the federal level, in-state 
preferences, and buy local preferences. In-state preferences, which are the focus of this 
study, are granted to in-state vendors because of their geographical location or because 
their goods and/or services are produced within the boundaries of the state's 
jurisdiction. The second type of procurement preference programs is mandated by non- 
geographical preference laws which are based on the socioeconomic classification of 
vendors. Using these non-geographical preference laws, governments award 
procurement preferences to small, minority, women, disabled, veteran and 
disadvantaged businesses. For example, the Small Business Act of 1953 was enacted to 
help small, minorities, and other disadvantaged businesses by giving them opportunities 
to expand their own businesses (Qiao et al., 2009). In addition "the Federal Acquisition 
Streamlining Act (FASA) of 1994...established a new 5% government-wide procurement 
goal for women-owned business" (Qiao et al., 2009, p. 376).
The practice of using various preference policies is widespread in the U.S. The 
National Association of State Procurement Officials (NASPO) released a 2011-2012 
Survey of State Government Purchasing Practices that consisted of 28 sections 
examining public procurement practices. In the section on state preference policies, the 
survey showed that twenty-five states provide preferences to in-state bidders or 
products that are not necessarily based on minority or women ownership or other 
criteria, and that in seventeen of the twenty-five states, the preferences are mandatory
3
(NASPO, 2012). The NASPO survey also reported that several states have adopted 
preferences based on the socioeconomic classification of a vendor. Table 1.1 lists the 
number of states that have vendor-based price preferences based on a variety of 
socioeconomic classifications.
Table 1.1 States that Have Vendor-Based 
(Non-Geographical-Based) Price Preferences
Vendor-Based Price Preferences Number of States
Women-owned business enterprise 4
Minority-owned business enterprise 6
Small business enterprise 11
Disabled-owned business enterprise 6
Sheltered workshop 18
Veteran-owned business enterprise 6
Service-disabled veteran owned business 6
Source: 2011-2012 NASPO Survey of State Procurement Practices
Rationales for adopting procurement preference policies are many and varied. At 
the 2nd International Procurement Conference of the Americas held in 2005, some 
scholars argued in favor of using preference policies to promote socioeconomic 
objectives (Qiao et al., 2009). Some of the most common reasons cited in the literature 
are a state's desire to increase competition in a specific industry and to engage and 
support local, small, minority, and disadvantaged businesses in the market place
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(Krasnokutskaya & Seim, 2008; Moreland, 2012; Qiao et al., 2009). A further rationale 
argued by some scholars is that procurement preference policies would enhance social 
equity by reserving some government contracts for minority and disadvantaged groups 
(Frederickson, 1990). Another important goal pertaining to economic growth and 
related mainly to in-state preference policies is that they encourage local businesses to 
stay in their home state, thus creating more jobs, keeping the current jobs in the 
economy, and increasing local tax returns by paying the tax dollars to the state (Hefner, 
1996; Krasnokutskaya & Seim, 2008; McCrudden, 2007; Moreland, 2012; Qiao et al., 
2009).
Although supporters provide rationales that appear to have some merit, the 
procurement preference policies have generated controversy in government and 
business circles as well as in academia. Critics invariably argue that preferential 
treatment "violate[s] the basic principles of public purchasing, equity, impartiality, open 
competition, and the least cost to the taxpayers" (Qiao et al., 2009, p. 379). In view of 
these deficiencies, preferential treatment policies run contrary to the free market 
principles and undermine competition in the market place. For example, The National 
Institute of Governmental Purchasing (NIGP) and NASPO, two groups that vigorously 
oppose procurement preference policies, argue that all types of preference laws and 
practices are inconsistent with the free enterprise system and impede competition in 
the market place (Moreland, 2012; Qiao et al., 2009; Short, 1992; Strayer, 2011). At the 
state level, critics further contend that preference policies that constrain/discourage 
competition and protect state vendors are likely to lead to higher taxes, higher product
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prices, and reduced efficiencies (Hefner, 1996). Critics also say that protecting in-state 
vendors from competition will limit their motivation to enhance labor productivity and 
develop cost saving strategies (Hefner, 1996). In addition to the previous criticisms of 
implementing preferences, there are legal challenges for implementing in-state 
preference policies. The basis for these challenges includes asserted violations of the 
U.S. Constitution’s Privileges and Immunities, Commerce, and Equal Protection clauses. 
Two cases that related to these challenges are citied in Chapter II of this dissertation.
In summary, the existence of opposing views raises concerns regarding the 
appropriateness of procurement preference policies that some states pursue vigorously 
(Krasnokutskaya & Seim, 2008). In light of the unresolved disputes or controversies 
between supporters and opponents about the benefits of procurement preference 
policies, it is important and proper to examine what the economic benefits from 
procurement preference policies are.
Problem Statement
When considering in-state preferences, policy makers must resolve what often 
appears to be a fundamental tension between those in favor of and those opposed to 
preferences. Taking advantage of the opportunities that in-state preference policies 
offer requires meeting the challenges presented by those opposed to the policies, and 
this dilemma has generated considerable debate among politicians, businesses, and 
academics. The debates surrounding in-state preference policies revolve in large part
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around a couple of issues such as whether in-state preference policies promote or 
hinder competition in the market place and provide economic gains or losses for the 
state. As noted previously, opponents of in-state preference policies invoke the 
principles of the free market economic system arguing that government interference 
distorts the functioning of the free market and undermines competition leading to 
inefficiencies, low productivity, and related economic malaise (Qiao et al., 2009). 
Because of these questions and concerns, procurement preference programs have been 
" a very important and controversial issue and ... research on many of its facets is 
limited" (Qiao et al., 2009, pp. 396-397). The controversies will continue unabated until 
more research provides evidence-based answers to help understand the economic 
impact of in-state preference policies.
The Purpose of this Research
The purpose of this research is to investigate the economic impacts of South 
Carolina's in-state procurement preference policies on the state economy. As indicated 
in the preceding section, both supporters and opponents of procurement preference 
policies make contradictory claims. Yet, there is a lack of studies to support their 
respective claims. This lack of investigation to determine the economic benefits of in­
state preference policies creates an important gap in the literature. This research 
attempts to begin to fill the current gap in the literature by examining the economic 
impacts from adopting procurement preference policies. It is important to emphasize
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that the intent of this scholarly research is not to explain the reasons behind preference 
policies since "their existence is more likely to be due to the political power of certain 
interest groups" (McAfee & McMillan, 1989, p. 292). Instead, this research primarily 
contributes to the area of preference policies because "a longitudinal review of [the 
policies'] results is never conducted" (Qiao et al., 2009, p. 397).
The Research Question
Research has shown that some states in the U.S. adopt procurement preference 
policies to promote important social and economic goals that include helping state 
businesses, protecting state vendors, creating more jobs, and increasing tax revenues 
for the state (Krasnokutskaya & Seim, 2008; Qiao et al., 2009). The purpose of this 
research is to examine the benefits the state of South Carolina could achieve by 
implementing the in-state preference policies for an eight-year period (2010-2017). To 
achieve this purpose, the research must answer the question: what are the impacts o f 
implementing the in-state procurement preference policies on the economy of the state 
of South Carolina? Using the case of South Carolina's preference policies, this research 
utilizes the Regional Economic Model Policy Insight (REMI PI+) for economic-forecasting 
and policy-analysis to estimate the economic impact of the South Carolina preference 
policies on the state economy.
Methodology
This research employs the Policy Insight Model (REMI PI+) developed by Regional 
Economic Model (REMI), Inc. Specifically, the Policy Insight, version 1. 5.2, also known 
by its abbreviation, PI+, is the version utilized in this research. The researcher uses the 
name REMI PI+ or simply PI+ interchangeably throughout this study. Researchers, 
practitioners and professionals from several private, public and nonprofit organizations 
have used the REMI model for structural forecasting and policy analysis for over thirty 
years. The REMI PI+ model is a useful analytical tool to examine in-state preference 
policies. Further details about the model's usage will be discussed in Chapter III of this 
dissertation. The researcher will use this model in this study to answer the research 
question and achieve the purpose of this research, which is to examine South Carolina's 
preference policies and their impacts on the economy of the state. Essentially, PI+ 
answers the question "What if...?" any change in a policy would affect the regional and 
local economies and adjust to those changes which will occur on a year-by-year basis 
(REMI, 2007). Below is a brief description of the selected model.
The overall structure of the REMI PI+ is divided into five major blocks. The blocks 
are output and demand, labor and capital demand, population and labor force, 
compensation, prices and costs, and market shares (see Chart 1.1 on page 16). Each 
block consists of economic variables. There is a high level of interaction and connection 
among these variables. For example, a small change in one variable will indeed affect
other variables in the same block and other blocks as well. The component parts of each 
block are:
•  The output and demand block- consists of output, demand, consumption, 
investment, government spending, exports, and imports.
•  The labor and capital demand block- includes labor intensity, labor productivity, 
and demand for labor and capital.
•  The population and labor supply block- consists of labor force participation rate 
and migration equations.
•  The compensation, prices, and costs block- consists of composite prices, 
determinants of production costs, the consumption price deflator, housing 
prices, and the compensation equations.
•  The market shares block- consists of the proportion of local, inter-regional, and 
export markets captured by each region.
By utilizing PI+, the researcher attempts to find out if implementing in-state 
preference policies can benefit the state's economy by creating more jobs, increasing 
personal income, real disposable personal income, value added, the state's population, 
Gross State Product (GSP), and output in the case of the state of South Carolina from 
2010 until 2017. South Carolina's procurement contract data are used as an input to the 
selected model. The data consists of a policy variable that is measured by the dollar 
amount of the industry sales. The dollar values of the state of South Carolina's 
procurement spending that was impacted by the in-state preference policies during the
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period 2010-2012 and the values of other economic variables explained in the five 
blocks in the previous paragraphs will be embedded in the PI+. The researcher obtained 
the data from the Office of Audit and Certification, a subdivision of the Procurement 
Services Office in South Carolina Budget and Control Board. For the years 2013- 2017, 
the average spending will be calculated and used to forecast the economic impact. 
REMI's staff developed the model and collected the data for the other variables 
included in the PI+ from the Bureau of Economic Analysis, the Bureau of Labor Statistics, 
the Department of Energy, and the Census Bureau.
Significance of this Research
Studies have shown the importance of government intervention in the economy 
on certain occasions to improve the welfare of a segment of society (Krueger, 1991; 
Reinert, 1999; World Trade Organization, 2012). Even though public procurement is a 
frequently used method to intervene in the economy, little has been written on this 
topic (MacManus, Watson, & Blair, 1992; McCue & Gianakis, 2001; Snider & Rendon, 
2008; Thai, 2001). Snider and Rendon (2008) have emphasized that scholars need to 
give sufficient attention and efforts in terms of conceptualizing and developing 
theoretical frameworks that can allow researchers and students alike to understand the 
complexities involved in making procurement policies. Similarly for in-state preference 
policies, scholars and researchers have emphasized the importance of conducting more 
research because "the practical impact of preferences is worthy of much more analysis"
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(Qiao et al., 2009, p. 397). Therefore, the contribution of this research is to establish the 
linkage between the conceptual (theoretical) knowledge and the practical application in 
the area of preference policies.
This research also will contribute to the body of knowledge of public 
procurement by enhancing the knowledge base of policymakers, voters and taxpayers. 
As Qiao et al. (2009, p. 398) asserted "procurement has always been and will continue 
to be used as an important policy tool for a wide range of socioeconomic and political 
purposes". In view of this assertion, research can help voters and taxpayers become 
more informed and gain the knowledge to understand the benefits of implementing 
preference policies. Furthermore, the results will provide an information base for 
policymakers, which could influence their perspectives and decisions pertinent to 
preferential policies. If the results show that procurement preference policies contribute 
to the economic goals, policy makers and public administrators should continue 
implementing these policies. In contrast, if the research findings show that South 
Carolina's preference policies are not achieving the desired goals, then the state 
policymakers may need to rethink implementing procurement preference policies. In 
either case, policymakers and public officials should give more attention to the costs 
associated with implementing the preference policies
This research provides database information about the state of South Carolina's 
preference policies specifically and preference policies in general. The data from the 
quarterly procurement preference reports will help to determine the type of goods and 
services and the industry used when implementing in-state preference policies.
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Furthermore, this data set will help decision makers learn more about the rules 
and procedures associated with applying for in-state preference policies. This research 
will move the field forward because it will establish a foundation for future investigation 
into the study of the economic impact on each of the 24 states applying in-state 
preferences. Other research areas could include a comparative study to increase 
understanding of the differences and the similarities among the in-state preference 
policies in the states. Comparing the economic impact between the 25 states will add a 
new perspective to the analysis and stands as a topic for future research. Finally, this 
study also highlighted the need to investigate reciprocal preferences.
Assumptions
Assumptions are essential for research, and four assumptions provide the basis 
for this study. First, the dollar values of the procurement contracts awarded based on 
preference policy were considered the sales variable. This study assumed that increases 
in sales in the economy sectors are due to implementing the in-state preference 
policies. Second, South Carolina state agencies reported to the South Carolina Budget 
and Control Board the procurement contracts awarded based on the in-state preference 
policies, and this study assumed that all the reported data are complete and correct.
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Third, after the South Carolina Budget and Control Board received the data about the 
procurement contracts, the Board compiled the data into Quarterly Preference reports. 
The assumption is that the reports contained accurate and correct data. Fourth, the 
researcher assumed that the North American Industry Classification System's (NAICS) 
identification for the procurement contracts is correct.
Limitations of this Research
Although twenty-five states have adopted in-state procurement preference laws 
in one form or another, this investigation is limited to the state of South Carolina. The 
researcher chose South Carolina because that state's central procurement office agreed 
to provide access to relevant procurement preference data. In addition, REMI Inc. has 
provided access to PI+ for the state of South Carolina for the purpose of this research; 
however, due to lack of funding, the researcher was not able to purchase additional 
versions of the model. The findings of this research, which focuses only on one state, 
cannot be generalized to other states, and this constitutes a limitation of this research. 
Another limitation is that the accuracy of the data collected from the Office of Audit and 
Certification, a subdivision of the Procurement Services Office in the South Carolina 
Budget and Control Board, and the values of all the variables embedded in the REMI PI+ 
model cannot be verified. In addition, the economic costs (except the direct preference 
cost) and the social benefits of the preference policies are not analyzed in this study,
and this constitutes a limitation of this research. The final limitation is that this analysis 
will not factor in the effect of reciprocal policies on South Carolina vendors when they 
bid on contracts in states that apply reciprocal policies. The effect of reciprocal policies 
on South Carolina vendors could be significant, meaning that the findings of this initial 
research could be misleading.
Organization of this Research
This research consists of five chapters. Chapter I introduced the background of 
this research and presented the problem, the purpose of the research and the research 
question in addition to the methodology, the assumptions, the significance and the 
limitations of the research. Chapter II provides a literature review that draws on 
theoretical perspectives related to international trade, national welfare, and social 
equity arguments. The previous studies and research presented in Chapter II help to 
understand the context of this research. Chapter III covers the methodology used in this 
research and includes an overview of the utilized PI+ and a description of all the model's 
variables and the data provided. Chapter IV discusses the analysis of the data and 
presents the results of the model. Chapter V summarizes the research and the results, 
the research implications, future research and limitations of the research.
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Chart 1.1: REMI Model's Blocks
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Public procurement has an important role in delivering goods and services to 
citizens. Even though one of the government's main responsibilities is to buy goods and 
services, a related responsibility is to achieve a variety of social, economic and 
environmental objectives through adopting a variety of policies such as state preference 
policies. State governments use in-state preference policies to grant an advantage to in­
state vendors when awarding procurement contracts. The implied main purpose of in­
state preferences is to create economic opportunity and to encourage in-state 
businesses to engage in productive economic activities for the benefit of the state's 
residents as a whole (Hefner, 1996; Krasnokutskaya & Seim, 2008; Qiao et al., 2009).
To study the impact of in-state preference policies on the state's economy, this 
research utilizes the international trade literature focusing on protectionist arguments. 
The international trade literature provides an overarching explanation to help 
understand what the state could predict as the result of applying the in-state 
preferences. Within the international trade context, governments use a variety of 
strategies such as tariffs, import quotas, subsidies and formal policies to intervene in 
trade. Formal policies represent a government's action to discriminate against foreign 
competitors and firms, and they are "often considered to be a non-tariff barrier to
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trade" (Trionfetti, 1999, p. 235). Since these formal policies "can be considered a part of 
a whole gamut of economic policies (such as tariffs, subsidies, exchange restrictions, and 
quotas)" (Lowinger, 1976, p. 451), studies have argued that the formal policies (non­
tariff barriers) would have a "protective effect" similar to the other tariff barriers 
(Lowinger, 1976; McAfee & McMillan, 1989).
In many respects, the rationales used by governments to intervene in 
international trade are strikingly similar to the rationales a state government employs 
for the adoption of in-state procurement preference policies. Like the international 
preference policies, state preference policies are formal policies that policy makers seek 
to use as non-tariff barriers within the state context. Therefore, this study argues that 
the theoretical arguments for or against a variety of discriminatory policies and 
strategies in international trade could help understand what the impact of in-state 
procurement preference policies would be in the context of the domestic economy.
This chapter will start with an overview of international trade theories and 
explain a variety of intervention strategies as instruments to trade. After the overview, 
there will be a discussion of general procurement preference policies followed by a 
specific focus on the preference policies implemented by the state of South Carolina.
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International Trade Theory
Governments around the world spend a significant amount of money to buy 
goods, services, and construction. Through their purchasing power, governments affect 
and stimulate the economic growth of their countries. A study by Trionfetti "estimatefs] 
[that] the size of the government procurement m arket... ranges between 8 and 12 per 
cent of GSP for industrialized countries" (Trionfetti, 2000, p. 73). Governments have the 
choice to purchase the needed products and services from local sources or from foreign 
countries. International trade policies are guided by international trade policies, and 
governments use these policies as a way to intervene in the economy.
Interventionism is an old idea that extends back to ancient times. As far back as 
the mid-sixteenth century, mercantilists sought to build national wealth through the 
accumulation of gold and silver by exporting more and importing less (Hill, 2011), which 
was in essence a restriction of free trade and a form of protectionism. But, subsequent 
theoretical developments, from Adam Smith's absolute advantage to Ricardo's 
comparative advantage, to Heckscher-Ohlin theory, to the development of new trade 
theory in recent times, have offered arguments for the continued use and promotion of 
trade between and among nations because of a strong belief that there are gains to be 
made from trade. Charles Hill, for example, provides the following historical anecdote 
regarding the start of free trade:
The theoretical case for free trade dates to the late eighteenth century and the 
work of Adam Smith and David Ricardo. Free trade as a government policy was 
first officially embraced by Great Britain in 1846, when the British Parliament 
repealed the Corn Laws that placed a high tariff on imports of foreign corn. The 
objectives of the Corn Laws were to raise government revenues and to protect 
British corn producers (Hill, 2011, p. 222).
Even though the development of trade theories helps explain the international 
trade patterns in the world, "they lack agreement in their recommendations for 
government policy" (Hill, 2011, p. 163). As such, governments use a variety of strategies 
to intervene in trade such as tariffs, import quotas, and subsidies. A tariff is a type of tax 
imposed on imports or exports. Tariffs are levied in two forms, either as a fixed 
percentage on each imported good or as a part of the value of the imported good.
Import quotas impose restrictions on the imported quantity to the country, while 
government provides subsidies in the form of cash, low-interest loans, and tax breaks.
Although these strategies differ in many respects, they still all constitute 
governmental intervention in trade. In addition to these strategies, governments 
employ formal and informal policies as barriers to trade. Formal policies require 
governments to give preference to specific products, services, or industries. For 
example, the U.S. government implements the Buy American Act, which gives 
preference to American products in awards of contracts by the U.S. government and 
recipients of grants-in-aid from the U.S. federal government. Other countries use 
informal policies to put up rules/barriers to restrict trade among other countries. 
France's demand that all videotape recorders imported from Japan enter the country 
from a point located far from the nearest shipping port is a clear example of an informal 
policy to restrict trade.
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As with all instruments and policies of trade, the question becomes why nations 
engage in discriminatory or preferential trade practices. Governments provide a variety 
of arguments to justify their interventions such as social, political, and economic 
reasons. Governmental decisions to grant preferential trade treatment are motivated by 
a desire to build strong relations between the countries to achieve some specified social 
or human rights objective. For example, prior to China joining the WTO in 2001, the 
United States granted Most Favored Nation (MFN) status to China to try to improve the 
human rights policies in that country (Green, 1993; Pregelj, 2001; Ward, 2000). MFN 
status allowed China to export goods to the United States at an average of 8 percent 
tariffs; without MFN, the tariffs would have been about 40 percent (Hill, 2011).
Of the various objectives countries hope to gain from applying preferential trade 
policies, the literature shows that protectionism overshadows the other motivations for 
governments' intervention (Hill, 2011). Governments protect consumers from 
dangerous products, protect the defense industry for reasons of national security, and 
protect jobs and industries from foreign competition.
On economic grounds, the oldest reason for protectionism was the infant 
industry argument (Hill, 2011; Hoekman, 1998). The infant industry argument was by far 
the most popular argument among developing nations (Shafaeddin, 2000) and had 
considerable influence in developed countries as well. The rationale was clear in that 
developing countries needed time to build their manufacturing sector so that the sector 
could compete with established industries in developed countries. Shafaeddin (2000, p.
2) argued "that infant industry protection is necessary for countries at the early stages
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of industrialization if some countries outdistanced others in manufactures".
Aside from the infant industry argument that was primarily applicable to 
developing countries, many developed nations have implemented different policies to 
erect protectionism against imports that threaten the survival of their domestic 
industries. Examples of protectionist policies adopted by many nations around the world 
including the United States and the European Union (EU) abound in the literature. One 
such example is the EU's establishment of the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP). The 
intent of the CAP policy was to protect the jobs of Europe's politically powerful farmers 
by restricting imports and guaranteeing prices, but studies showed that the 
consequence was higher prices for consumers.
In the case of the United States, there are many instances where the 
government resorted to protectionism on economic and/or political grounds. Historical 
accounts reveal that during the height of the Great Depression, the U.S. Congress 
passed the Smoot-Hawley Act in 1930 to deal with the rising level of unemployment by 
protecting domestic industries and restricting imports. The tariff was increased by about 
60 percent on more than 3000 products and 900 American import duties were created 
(Boffa & Olarreaga, 2012; Hill, 2011; The Economist, 2009).
The Smoot-Hawley Act is a case in point that provides an example that even 
economically advanced nations such as the United States, that are expected to gain the 
most from free trade, do sometimes resort to protectionism because of economic 
imperatives at a given historical juncture. According to some studies, while the Smoot- 
Hawley Act appeared to protect the local industries at the time, the Act nonetheless
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caused a retaliatory response from nearly 60 countries, and world trade plummeted; 
this retaliatory response was believed to be the primary contributor to a seventy 
percent reduction in world trade by 1933 (Boffa & Olarreaga, 2012). Latter time 
economists and other writers alike characterized the Smoot-Hawley Act as a failure 
because it had a damaging effect on employment abroad, which in turn, forced other 
countries to react to the U.S. action by raising their own tariff barriers, commonly 
referred to in the literature as "a beggar thy neighbor policy". As a result, U.S. exports 
tumbled in response, and the world slid further into the Great Depression. Hill (2011, p. 
223) emphasized the fact that the Act "erected an enormous wall of tariff barriers. 
Almost every industry was rewarded with its 'made-to- order' tariff".
Literature shows that there were instances where the United States also 
intervened in international trade to protect U.S. farmers. For example, in 2000,
President George W. Bush signed $180 billion subsidies for U.S. farmers, and a bill 
containing $286 billion in subsidies for 10 years was signed in 2007 (Hill, 2011). In 
addition, in 2002, the U.S. placed tariffs on imports of foreign steel to give competitive 
advantage to American steel industries so that American jobs could be protected (Hill, 
2011).
While strong economic arguments can be made in support of subsidies and 
tariffs, the actions nonetheless represent protectionism and contradict the principles of 
free international trade (Ferrini, 2012; Hickok, 1985; Hill, 2011; Hufbauer, Berliner, & 
Elliott, 1986; Tarr & Morkre, 1984; Wood & Mudd, 1978). To fight protectionism and 
advocate for unrestricted free trade, a variety of international agreements such as the
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General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), the Government Procurement
Agreement (GPA), and a series of Directives from the European Union (EU) have
continued to play an important role in ensuring the free flow of goods and services
across national borders.
Many nations embrace the principles of free trade and accept the rules of the
World Trade Organization (WTO), the successor of GATT. In 1947, the U.S. led the
establishment of GATT and by 2003,159 nations had signed the multilateral agreement
which regulates trade among countries and mainly aims to reduce any type of
protectionist instruments or policies. As an effort to extend the basic principles of GATT,
the Government Procurement Agreement (GPA) was signed in 1979 and entered into
force in 1981 as a "plurilateral" agreement. Today, 15 countries have signed the GPA
and three countries are considering the adoption of the rules (OUSTR, 2012).
The GPA is perhaps one of the most important international agreements
pertaining to government procurement regulation today. GPA generally prohibits
discriminatory policies favoring domestic firms and encourages competitive tendering
procedures. However, GPA also has provisions that allow countries to engage in
negotiations as the quotation below demonstrates.
Although in principle the GPA prohibits signatories from discriminating in favor 
of domestic firms, developing countries negotiate mutually acceptable 
exclusions from the rules on national treatment for certain entities, products, or 
services. Such negotiations may also be initiated after signing the procurement 
agreement. That option, however, is limited to certain entities, products or 
services, and the scope to pursue such policies is therefore inherently limited by 
the relative negotiating power of the country seeking to apply them (Hoekman, 
1998, pp. 252-253).
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In addition to GATT and GPA, the European Union (EU) also has made important 
contributions in terms of adopting a series of procurement directives that affected the 
development of the previous GPA principles (Gordon, Rimmer, & Arrowsmith, 1998). 
The EU and the GPA have common objectives regarding their approach to procurement 
regulations and markets. For example, the EU has a "public procurement legislation 
[that] sets out procedures and practices to which central and local government and 
other public bodies must adapt their award procedures, where the value of the contract 
as estimated under the rules meets the relevant threshold" (Achille, 2011, p. 2). In 
general, all the EU directives imply that public procurement markets should be open 
among all competitors without discrimination. "The basic principles [are], notably non­
discrimination, equal treatment and transparency in the publicity of proposed 
procurement contracts, design of technical specifications; choice of procurement 
procedure; qualification and selection of candidates and tenderers [and] award of 
contracts" (OECD, 2011, p. 3).
The impact and effectiveness of the EU procurement rules have been examined 
in the literature (Cox & Furlong, 1995; Erridge, Fee, & Mcllroy, 1998; Gelderman, 
Ghijsen, & Brugman, 2006; Madsen, 2002; Nielsen & Hansen, 2001). Gordon et al.
(1998) analyzed a study by the European Commission that investigated the impact of 
the European procurement rules on the effectiveness of the EU's procurement policy 
from 1987 to 1994. The results of the analysis showed that apart from a very few 
sectors the EU's desired objectives against protectionism were largely not achieved due 
primarily to "the problem of effective enforcement, lack of clarity in the rules, the
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existence of structural market obstacles, and lack of response on the supply side" 
(Gordon et al., 1998, p. 185).
However, other studies have reported positive results about the direct impact of 
the EU's procurement policies. For example, the European Commission (2004) prepared 
a study to evaluate the impact of EU's rules and directives for the period 1995-2002 on 
the transparency of procurement procedures, the prices of goods and services, and the 
cross-border activity in public procurement markets. The analysis indicated the 
existence of "positive developments in market transparency, increased cross border 
competition and price savings derived from the implementation of public procurement 
directives (European Commission, 2004, p. 1). The report also pointed to overwhelming 
evidence supporting the active contributions of current directives to reform the public 
procurement markets (European Commission, 2004).
The decisions made and the actions taken to erect barriers to free trade are not 
without consequences; there are indeed impacts and effects associated with the policies 
of protectionism that seek to protect domestic industries by creating trade barriers. 
Researchers began to study the economic impact of discriminatory procurement 
practices on international trade flow in the 1970s (Audet, 2002; Baldwin, 1982; Baldwin 
&. Richardson, 1972; Lowinger, 1976). The work by Baldwin and Richardson (1972) is 
considered to be the starting point for research into discriminatory procurement 
practices within the international trade context.
Basing their investigation on the assumptions that the market is perfectly 
competitive, and that the imported commodities are identical to the commodities
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produced domestically, Baldwin and Richardson (1972) and Baldwin (1970,1982) set up 
a model to analyze the impact of the discriminatory policies on imports, output, and 
domestic prices, and then used the model to estimate the impact of the Buy American 
Act of 1933 on imports. Their model is based on demand and supply curves and input- 
output tables. According to their analysis, they found that the effect of giving preference 
to domestic producers is varied. After imposing the preference, government demand 
shifted from foreign products to local products, and as a result the prices of domestic 
products rose above the foreign prices and shifted private demand from domestic to 
foreign procurers. In this case, if government demand is less than the domestic supply, 
there is no effect from the preferences. If government demand is larger than domestic 
supply, the domestic prices increase, the output of domestic producers increases and 
the price of imports decreases.
On the basis of the previous discussion, Baldwin and Richardson (1972) and 
Baldwin (1970,1982) concluded that the Buy American Act reduced total U.S. imports 
between $76 million to $110 million, which is considered to be a small impact compared 
to U.S. total imports. They concluded that when government demand for domestic 
product shifts, the private sector's imports shift as well in an equal and opposite 
direction. Reaching a similar conclusion Deltas and Evenett (1997) found that the extra 
procurement costs offset the extra welfare gains from implementing the discriminatory 
procurement policies.
Following Baldwin and Richardson's assumption that the market is perfectly 
competitive, Herander (1982) investigated the impact of discriminatory policies on 
domestic output, consumption, the price of the good in the importing country, and the 
level of imports. He investigated the impact between two countries using a partial 
equilibrium model. When Herander analyzed three scenarios depending on whether 
government demand is larger, smaller, or equal to the domestic supply, he found that 
when the government demand is larger than or equal to the domestic supply, imports 
decrease, and domestic output and prices increase. However, when government 
demand is less than the domestic supply, the discriminatory policy is ineffective.
In addition to the previous studies, Lowinger (1976) used input-output tables to 
compare government imports and private sector imports during the 1970s for the U.S., 
U.K. and EU member countries. He based his analysis on the assumption that the 
quantitative difference between the countries' imports equals the impact of 
discriminatory policies. He concluded that the U.S.'s degree of discrimination is the 
highest and has the largest effect on imports. So, when the U.S. reduces its 
discriminatory policies, its imports are expected to increase six or seven times the actual 
level of imports.
Expanding Lowinger's work, Deardorff and Stern (1981) studied the impact of 
the reduced tariffs discussed at the Tokyo Roundtable on exports, employment, 
economic welfare, exchange rates and imports. By using demand and supply models for 
several developed and developing countries, they concluded that reducing tariffs would 
result in "relatively small but beneficial economic effects for practically all the major
28
industrialized countries and for some of the major developing countries" (Deardorff & 
Stern, 1981, p. 148).
In conclusion, beginning in the 1970s, economists conducted research to study 
one or more aspects of the impact of discriminatory policies on international trade and 
trade flow. However, overtime, scholars have failed to address some aspects of the 
policy, and have identified caveats in the previous work and attempted to address them  
by adding more dimensions to their research. Audet (2002, pp. 157-158) summarized 
the progression of the research from the 1970s to current times:
This brief survey of academic research on the impact of government 
procurement on international specialization and trade highlights the inherently 
complex task of conceptualizing multiple and intertwined factors into a 
theoretical modeling exercise, particularly in conceptualizing implicit forms of 
discriminatory practices. Greater understanding of several related aspects, such 
as transparency and non-discriminatory provisions, bidders' behavior, 
informational asymmetries, distribution effects and the dynamic effects of 
procurement preferences, could usefully provide additional policy underpinning 
and insights.
Generally, the results of research show that the impacts of favoring local vendors 
in the international trade theory context depend on the setting, the assumptions made, 
and the methods used in the analysis, and therefore, the impacts of preference policies 
on the economy are mixed. However, this research argues that the trade framework still 
does provide a theoretical base for studying in-state preferences. The following section 
gives an overview of procurement preference policies.
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Procurement Preference Policies
As the previous discussion indicated, national governments intervene in trade 
mainly to protect their own country's vendors and suppliers. Similarly, state 
governments use procurement preference policies to protect in-state businesses from 
being undermined or undercut by large conglomerates that may come from within the 
state or from neighboring states (McCrudden, 2007; Qiao et al., 2009). So, the rationale 
for adopting procurement preference policies in the domestic context is similar to the 
rationale presented in support of government intervention in international trade.
Governments apply preference policies to protect vendors and achieve a variety 
of social, economic and political goals. Preference policies may stimulate the economy 
and as a result improve the welfare of disadvantaged members of society as well as 
advance the collective interests of the citizens of the country. Another rationale for the 
adoption of preference policies is a state's desire to increase competition in a specific 
industry (Hefner, 1996; Krugman & Obstfeld, 1991). On the state and local levels, 
preference policies help to engage and protect local businesses in the market place thus 
serving as incentives for local businesses to stay, grow, and thrive in the state, as well as 
to create more jobs and expand the state's tax base.
Some scholars support the view that procurement preference policies are an 
appropriate tool to promote economic goals, and it is common to see policymakers at all 
levels of government use preference policies even though critics point to the potential 
problems associated with them. However, opponents of preferential treatments argue
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against the use of preference policies claiming that preferential treatment runs contrary 
to the free market principles, increases cost to government, and undermines 
competition in the market place (Krasnokutskaya & Seim, 2008; McCrudden, 2007; Qiao 
et al., 2009; Short, 1992). For example, NIGP vigorously opposes preference policies 
arguing that all types of preference laws and practices are inconsistent with the free 
enterprise system and impede competition in the market place (Achille, 2011). In a 
similar vein, NASPO opposes procurement preference policies arguing that businesses 
and special interest groups are likely to exercise undue influence in the promotion of 
preference laws. NASPO stated, "preference provisions and practices should be 
eliminated from public purchasing. Government bodies and legislatures must recognize 
that preference is promoted by business and special interest groups, that the net effect 
is costly, and that efforts to establish or maintain preference need to be resisted" (as 
citied in Qiao et al., 2009, p. 379). Critics further contend that preference policies 
constrain/discourage competition and protect local vendors and are likely to lead to 
higher taxes, higher product prices, and reduced efficiencies (Strayer, 2011). They also 
feel that protecting local vendors from competition will limit their motivation to 
enhance labor productivity and to develop cost saving strategies (Hefner, 1996).
Furthermore, opponents point out that the preference laws have been 
challenged on the basis of the Equal Protection Clause in different states (Hefner, 1996; 
Qiao et al., 2009). For example, Smith Setzer & Sons, Inc. challenged the in-state 
preference laws in South Carolina when they submitted a bid to supply concrete culvert 
pipe in South Carolina. Smith Setzer & Sons, Inc. provided the lowest bid on 15 out of 47
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sub-bids for the pipe contract, but they were not qualified to claim the in-state 
preferences. So as a result, the corporation was awarded only two contracts and 
consequently sued South Carolina for violating the Equal Protection Clause. After going 
through the courts, "it was conceded that the preference scheme would withstand an 
equal protection challenge, so long as the challenge drawn is rationally related to a 
legitimate state interest" (Hefner, 1996, p. 34). Similarly, in an award involving a racial 
preference rather than a preference based on the location of a bidder, the city of 
Richmond was challenged under the Equal Protection Clause when it awarded a city 
construction procurement project based on the city's minority business preference 
policies (Chambers, 1991; Gregg & Karen, 1990; Qiao et al., 2009). In this case, the court 
concluded that "the [city] plan was not narrowly focused since it permitted minorities 
from outside the Richmond area to participate in an absolute preference over other 
citizens purely on race" (as citied in Qiao et al., 2009, p. 380).
The variety of procurement preferences are categorized under two types: 
geographical and non-geographical preference laws (Qiao et al., 2009; Short, 1992). The 
geographical preferences are based on the "geographical location" of a vendor or where 
a product or service is "made". There are three types of geographical preferences based 
on the level of the government implementing the preference; the three preferences are 
the Buy American Act at the federal level, in-state preferences at the state level, and 
buy local preferences at the local level.
In 1933, Congress passed the Buy American Act which was enacted to protect 
the American economy by requiring the U.S. government to purchase U.S.-made 
products and provide employment opportunities for American workers (Pitzer & Thai, 
2009; Qiao et al., 2009). At the state level, the in-state preferences are granted to in­
state vendors because of their geographical location, and/or because their goods and/or 
services are produced within the boundaries of the state's jurisdiction. Buy local 
preferences also require local procurement officials to follow a formal and/or informal 
competitive bidding process to give advantage to local vendors over non-local vendors 
when local governments are in need of products and/or services.
There are five types of laws to grant the geographical preferences. First, the tie 
bid preference gives preference to in-jurisdiction bidders only if their bids are identically 
priced with the other non-local bidders. Second, a percentage preference applies a fixed 
percentage of the bid price to the out-of-jurisdiction firm's bid price; the in-jurisdiction 
bidder is then considered the low bid if the adjusted bid is less than the actual bid price 
of the out-of-jurisdiction bidder. Third, the absolute preference policy requires the 
purchasing office of the jurisdiction " to buy certain goods or services from vendors 
[located] within a designated area" (Qiao et al., 2009, p. 374). Fourth, general 
preference law gives a wide range of preference to serve the interest of the state (Qiao 
et al., 2009; Short, 1992); however "due to its administrative ambiguousness, it is 
difficult to document or assess this type of preference law" (Qiao et al., 2009, p. 373). 
Lastly, the reciprocal preference laws add a percentage to the out-of-state vendors 
when their own states impose preferences on the out-of-state vendors, so they work in
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the opposite direction of in-state preference policies. Thirty-five states apply reciprocal 
preference laws to achieve equal treatment for their interested vendors against the 
bidders who get preference treatment in their own states.
In addition to the previous preferences based on geographical criteria, the 
second type of preference programs comprises those in which governments have 
adopted non-geographical preferences. These preferences are based on the 
socioeconomic classification of vendors and are awarded to small, minority, women, 
disabled, veteran and disadvantaged businesses. Scholars have argued that reserving 
some government contracts for a specific part of the society would indeed enhance 
social equity (Frederickson, 1990; Hefner, 1996; Krasnokutskaya & Seim, 2008; Qiao et 
al., 2009). Thus, preference policies could be used in the economic sphere to reduce 
severe income inequality.
Historical accounts reveal that underserved businesses "have historically been 
uninvolved in the contracting and procurement activities of government agencies and 
authorities" (Rice, 1991, p. 114). To correct this past discrimination, governments at the 
federal and state level have passed laws requiring government agencies to reserve or 
set aside some procurement contracts for a certain segment of businesses to encourage 
them to participate in the local economy (Enchautegui, Fix, Loprest, Lippe, & Wissoker, 
1997) and to overcome the "continuing effects of past discrimination" (Svara & Brunet, 
2004, p. 100). According to Enchautegui et al. (1997), at least at the federal level, there 
were many acts that required the federal government to give advantages to minorities 
and small businesses such as the 1997 Small Business Reauthorization Act. The authors
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thus remarked: "No doubt the set-aside provision has enhanced social equity" 
(Enchautegui et al., 1997, p. 15). To defend the set-aside programs, disparity studies 
that focused on the effect of past discrimination in federal government contracts 
against minority-owned businesses have been conducted and documented (Bates,
2001). For example, according to Rice (1991), the city of Atlanta conducted a disparity 
study to provide evidence of discrimination against minority entrepreneurs, and the 
results showed that discrimination had occurred in many areas of economic activities 
including construction, real estate, architectural, and energy industries. Statistical data 
also documented discriminatory practices in the financial sector between black-owned 
and white-owned businesses (Rice, 1991).
Nevertheless, some studies reveal that set-aside programs have been criticized 
for violating the fundamental principles of equity. Critics point out that the granting of 
public contracts based on a set of rules or criteria that favor certain socioeconomic 
classes or groups of individuals is fundamentally flawed and runs contrary to the equity 
principles that involve fairness, efficiency, justice and equal treatment in public service 
delivery and public policy implementations (Qiao et al., 2009; Short, 1992).
Although it is possible to question the results of granting preferences, a NASPO 
survey conducted in 2012 nevertheless found that 25 states provide in-state preference 
policies for local vendors and/or local products. This research focuses on the in-state 
preference policies of South Carolina, one of the states identified in the NASPO survey. 
The South Carolina General Assembly rewrote the previous law about in-state 
preferences and provided expanded legal authority to the state government to use
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preference policies. "The General Assembly finds that it is crucial to this state's 
economic recovery to purchase goods manufactured and produced in the State, 
maintain the circulation of the funds of the citizens of this State within this State, and 
encourage and facilitate job development and economic growth" (2009 Act No. 72, p.
3).
According to Act No. 72 enacted by the South Carolina General Assembly, 
vendors should request the in-state preference for solicitation and provide documents 
to prove that they qualify for the preferences. South Carolina has two types of 
preferences: commodity contract preferences and service contract preferences. The 
commodity contract preferences include United States end-product preference (USEPP), 
South Carolina end-product preference (SCEPP), and resident vendor preference (RVP). 
The commodity contract preferences apply to specific end-products and require 
companies to meet specific requirements. For example, the 2009 Act No.72 stipulates 
that to apply for the RVP, the vendors must maintain an office or location in South 
Carolina at the time of the bid. In addition to maintaining an office, vendors should 
meet other criteria such as having either an inventory of commodities on which the 
award will be made with a value of fifty thousand dollars [$50,000] or an amount equal 
to the annual amount of the contract or having a manufacturer headquartered in South 
Carolina with an annual payroll of at least one million dollars (2009 Act No. 72). To 
qualify for the SCEPP, vendors should bid a South Carolina end-product, and to qualify 
for USEPP, vendors should bid a U.S. end-product. U.S. or South Carolina end-product 
means that products must have been manufactured or grown in the United States of
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America or in South Carolina. After determining the eligibility requirement to receive 
the preference, the procurement officer lowers the price for that line item before 
comparing the price to other vendors. Subsequently, the price is decreased by a certain 
percentage depending on the preferences for which the bidder qualifies. This is done for 
evaluation purposes only. In the end, the lowest bidder wins the bid.
The following summary provided by the South Carolina Budget and Control 
Board illustrates the bidding process. "Vendor A and Vendor B both submit bids for a 
single line item of equipment. Vendor A bids $12,000. Vendor B bids $11,500. Vendor 
A's equipment qualifies for the SCEPP. Vendor B's equipment does not. For purposes of 
evaluation, Vendor A's price will be decreased by seven percent (7%), down to 
$11,160.00. Vendor A wins the bid and the South Carolina government pays the $12,000 
to vendor A" (South Carolina Budget and Control Board, 2009, para 29-30). If the 
vendors qualify for more than one type of preference, the cumulative amount is capped 
not to exceed a certain amount. Essentially, there are two types of caps. One of the caps 
refers to the cumulative benefit of all preferences applied to the price of a line item and 
is capped not to exceed ten percent (10%) or $500,000 for a single award. The second 
type limits the amount of the cap to $50,000 for a single award with a total potential 
value in excess of $500,000.
In addition to the commodity/product contract preferences, the state offers 
contract preferences for services that are designated as resident contractor preference 
(RCP) and resident subcontractor preference (RSCP). Like the preferences mentioned 
above, vendors must also meet certain requirements in order to qualify for either of
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these contract preferences. To qualify for the RCP, a vendor must "maintain an office" in 
South Carolina, hire employees "domiciled" in the state and have labor costs that 
exceed fifty percent of the total bid price. The requirement to qualify for the resident 
subcontractor preference (RSCPs) is far more stringent than for RCP. To qualify for RSCP, 
a vendor must "have a documented commitment from a single proposed first-tier 
subcontractor to perform some portion of the services expressly required by the 
solicitation", hire employees "domiciled" in the state, have vendor labor costs exceeding 
twenty percent of the total bid price, and "identify the subcontractor that will perform 
the work, the work the subcontractor is to perform, and [the] factual basis for 
concluding that the subcontractor's work constitutes the required percentage of the 
work to be performed in the procurement" (South Carolina Budget and Control Board, 
2009, para 37). A summary of the percentages for each type of preference is presented 
in Table (2.2) below.






RSCP-2% 2% (each sub)
RSCP-4% 4% (each sub)
Source: South Carolina Budget and Control Board
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After an extensive survey of the literature, the researcher found that there is a 
lack of studies attempting to show the relationship between procurement preference 
policies and economic benefits at the state and local level. Only a few relevant studies 
were identified in the literature. In 1996, economist Hefner conducted research in the 
context of the state of South Carolina. In his study, Hefner (1996) sought to measure the 
economic impact of not applying procurement preference to a concrete pipes contract 
in the state of South Carolina. The concrete pipes award was challenged on a legal basis 
in the court. By using the Regional Input-Output Modeling System (RIMS II), Hefner 
estimated how many jobs, how much earning (personal incomes), and how much 
income taxes (individual, corporate, retail sales taxes) the state economy would lose if 
the preference was not implemented. The results showed that South Carolina's 
economy would lose 27 job opportunities, $650,000 in personal income and $32,500 in 
income taxes. He concluded that awarding the contract by implementing the policy 
would help the state economy.
In another study involving a case in South Carolina, Lowenstein (2011) provided 
an extensive overview of preference policies in Horry County, South Carolina. By 
employing the economic background and rationale for the preference policies, 
Lowenstein introduced a framework that shows how local preference would be applied 
in the county. Using the economic multiplier for Horry County and assuming that 90% of 
government purchases are local, Lowenstein concluded that "a local purchasing 
preference could potentially generate nearly $158 million in economic activity, 
creating/retaining a minimum of 160 jobs" (Lowenstein, 2011, p. 53).
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A further study discussing preference policies and economic benefits was done 
by Jensen (2011). Using qualitative data, he investigated how North Carolina's local 
governments practice preferences and also extended the study to neighboring states 
(South Carolina and Georgia) to review their preference policies. Combining and 
analyzing data from surveys, phone interviews, and documents, the analysis showed a 
variety of findings. First, North Carolina local governments have no formal local 
preference policies, although they do practice informal local preferences. Second, when 
participants were asked why their local governments practice preferences, "promotion 
of local businesses was the most frequently cited answer. Following was job creation, 
increased tax base, sustainability and wealth creation" (Jensen, 2011, p. 3 ). Finally, in 
regard to the neighboring states, Jensen's results showed that South Carolina and 
Georgia practice local preferences formally and apply them differently from North 
Carolina.
In addition to the previous studies specific to South and North Carolina, the 
literature review showed several studies that have examined the benefits of local 
business to the economy within their jurisdictions. For example, Rodriguez and Houston 
(2007) compared the impact of Wist Office Products (Wist) and Office Max Contract 
(Office Max) on the economy of the state of Arizona. Both businesses represent 
different degrees of locality. Wist is described to be "a true local supplier" (Rodriguez & 
Houston, 2007, p. 10) because all the offices, employees, warehouse, distribution, and 
administration are local, but Office Max has only a warehouse and small staff locally. 
Labor, profit, procurement, and charity represented the four elements to calculate how
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much money was kept in the state economy. According to the findings, 33.4% of Wist's 
total revenue remains in the local economy, but 11.6% of Office Max's total revenue 
remains. The study concluded that:
Local suppliers generate dramatically greater economic activity than their chain 
competitors. In the case at hand, using the most locally invested of the national 
chain suppliers, one with a sizeable physical presence in the Phoenix area, the 
local firm generates nearly three times the economic impact (Civic Economics, 
2007, p. 12).
In another study undertaken by Civic Economics Center, the researchers 
analyzed the economic impact of local businesses in Grand Rapids, Michigan. They 
concluded that 10% increases in consumer purchasing to local business would add 
approximately $140 million in new economic activity, generate over 1600 new jobs, and 
provide over $50 million in new wages.
The literature also revealed that some studies focused on other aspects related 
to procurement preference policies. For example, researchers have studied the impact 
of preferences on government procurement costs, on the bidding behavior of vendors, 
and on participation decisions of vendors (Baldwin & Richardson, 1972; De Silva, Dunne, 
Kosmopoulou, & Lamarche, 2011; Krasnokutskaya & Seim, 2008; Marion, 2007; McAfee 
& McMillan, 1989; Trionfetti, 2000).
The arguments for and against preferences policies offer conflicting but powerful 
arguments. Each approach has sought to inform state procurement preference policies, 
but the debates continue. Research can help to confirm if the procurement preferential 
policies achieve the desired economic goals. As the review of the literature indicates,
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some state governments have used procurement preference policies to stimulate the 
economy and expand the tax bases. One such state is South Carolina, and this study 
seeks to examine the impact of South Carolina's procurement preference policies on the 
economy of the state.
The first part of this chapter presented an overview of international trade 
literature and discussed a variety of protectionist policies. The second part of this 
chapter focused on the preference policies implemented by the state of South Carolina. 




Research has shown that many states exert considerable effort to affect social 
and economic objectives through procurement policies such as in-state preference 
policies (NASPO, 2012). According to NASPO (2012), there are 25 states including South 
Carolina that have provided in-state preference for state vendors and/or state products. 
South Carolina has implemented the in-state preference policies to help the state 
recover from its economic crisis (2009 Act No. 72). This research employs the Regional 
Economic Models, Inc. (REMI) Policy Insight (PI+) Model to estimate the impact of South 
Carolina's in-state preference policies on the economy of the state for the years 2010 
through 2017. This chapter presents an overview of the model, description of the 
model, REMI simulation model, data, and a detailed description of the REMI model.
Overview of the Model
This section describes the rationales and justifications for the selection of the 
Regional Economic Models, Inc. (REMI) Policy Insight (PI+) Model to answer the 
proposed research question, which is what are the impacts o f implementing the in-state 
procurement preference policies on the economy of the state o f South Carolina? PI+ 
involves the use of a simulation model that has been utilized by researchers for over 
thirty years to conduct economic impact analysis. PI+ provides quantifiable results with 
numerical values to answer the research question.
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There are several compelling reasons for selecting the REMI PI+ model for this 
research. One of the main reasons for selecting REMI PI+ is because it integrates the 
three models that economists have used to study the impact of either adding or 
eliminating protectionist instruments (i.e. tariffs and non-tariffs) within the trade 
theory. Since trade theory was used as an overarching theory in this research, it seemed 
appropriate to select REMI as a research tool. A review of the trade literature reveals 
that the three models are: input-output models (Deardorff & Stern, 1981; Lowinger, 
1976), supply-demand equations (Baldwin, 1982; Baldwin & Richardson, 1972; Breton & 
Salmon, 1996; Herander, 1982), and computable general equilibrium model (Deardorff 
& Stern, 1981). These models consist of embedded mathematical equations that explain 
the relationships and the linkages among a variety of economic variables. A "run" or 
simulation of these models represents a "shock" to the economy such as imposing a 
tariff. The embedded relationships within these models trace the economic impacts 
generated by the shock and provide quantifiable values for the impacts.
A second reason for selecting this model is that the research question of this 
research aligns closely with the stated goals of REMI PI+. One of the main goals of REMI 
PI+ is "understanding how government actions...affect the world around us" (REMI, n.d., 
p. 2). More specifically, the goal is to help "government decision-makers [to] test the 
economic effects of their policies" (REMI, n.d., p. 2). Given these similarities, the REMI 
PI+ seemed an appropriate model to use.
The third reason for choosing the REMI PI+ model is that it can be customized for 
any specific geographic region such as a state, county or city. In this research, REMI PI+
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will be customized for the state of South Carolina. Repeatability is the final reason for 
selecting the REMI PI+. The repeated use of the model for economic impact analysis 
establishes confidence over time and adds more reliability to the model to conduct this 
analysis (Cassing & Giarratani, 1992). PI+ has been in existence for more than 30 years 
and has been used in a wide variety of situations by many scholars, researchers, 
practitioners and professionals from several private, public and nonprofit organizations. 
The model simulations in PI+ are also used to assess "economic and demographic 
effects in wide-ranging initiatives such as: economic impact analysis; policies and 
programs for economic development, infrastructure, environment, energy and natural 
resources; and state and local tax changes" (REMI, 2012, para 2). The findings from 
these studies were published in various journals such as the American Economic Review, 
the Review o f Economic Statistics, the Journal o f Regional Science, and the International 
Regional Science Review (REMI, 2012).
Researchers have examined the validity of the REMI model in a variety of 
scholarly works (Cassing & Giarratani, 1992; Rose, Wei, & Dormady, 2011; Treyz, 
Rickman, & Shao, 1991). To validate the estimation ability of the model, Cassing and 
Giarratani (1992) calculated the post-sample period forecasts for all fifty states and 
Washington, D.C. by using actual historical values. The Mean Absolute Percentage Error 
(MAPE) was then calculated to represent the difference between the predicted values 
and the actual values, and the results showed "that the REMI model produces very good 
forecasts over a short period of time beyond the historical data sample. As expected for 
all forecasting models, prediction accuracy deteriorates as the forecasting period
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lengthens. Studies also indicated that REMI can predict major changes in the direction of 
economic activity for larger industries" (Rose et al., 2011, p. 359). By using multivariate 
econometric analysis, Rose et al. (2011, p. 358) evaluated "the explanatory power of the 
REMI model and consistency of its output with regard to policy variables". The analysis 
"confirm[s] the close proximity between the combination of direct and indirect 
macroeconomic impacts and the direct impact assessments of stakeholders...the results 
represent a strong validation of the application of the REMI model to the analysis in this 
paper" (Rose et al., 2011, p. 374). Moreover, Rickman and Schwer (1995) compared the 
multipliers of the REMI model with two other input-output models, the Impact Analysis 
for Planning (IMPLAN) and the Regional Input-Output Modeling System (RIMS II). To 
compare the three models, the authors created benchmarked versions of the three 
models to account for the difference in techniques used to calculate national input- 
output coefficients. The results showed that there is no significant difference among the 
multipliers for the three models. Rickman and Schwer suggested that this conclusion 
could help researchers and practitioners to be more confident in using ready-made 
models in their research.
At the state level, the REMI model is used because it is "the most widely used 
state-level economic modeling software package in the U.S." (Rose, Wei, & Prager,
2010, p. 9). Almost every state government agency has applied a REMI Model (Rose et 
al., 2010). Some of these states are: Florida, Pennsylvania, Michigan, California and New 
Mexico. In Florida, the model was used to investigate the impacts of the Florida Energy 
and Climate Change Action Plan (FECCAP) on the state's economy (Rose & Wei, 2012)
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while in Michigan, the model was used to analyze the macroeconomic impact of the 
Michigan Climate Action Plan (Miller, Wei, & Rose, 2010). Pennsylvania used the model 
to evaluate the impacts of the Pennsylvania Climate Action Plan on the state's economy 
for the period of 2009-2020 (Rose et al., 2011).
Although REMI PI+ is a commonly used model, it has some limitations. First, as is 
the case with other economic impact models, it is possible that REMI could be viewed as 
a black box by those who are not familiar with the model. However, to withstand this 
limitation REMI Inc. has provided documents on their website to review all assumptions, 
equations and data sources. The second limitation is that REMI PI+ is not capable of 
providing tax revenue as a separate output; thus, the researcher cannot capture the 
impact of tax revenue on the state economy. Third, REMI PI+ can estimate the economic 
impacts for only three consecutive years (2010 - 2012) because of the way the model is 
built. The model does not run simulations in years with actual historical data, and the 
last year of historical data is 2009.
In spite of the limitations noted above, the REMI model estimates the impact of 
in-state preference policies by measuring the most commonly reported economic 
indicators: output (sales), employment, personal income, real disposable personal 
income, Gross State Product (GSP), and state's population. Output, which can be 
thought of as sales, is measured by the amount of production sold to the intermediate 
and final consumers. Employment is the total number of full-time and part-time jobs in 
government and the private sector. Private sector employment is determined by the 
value added which represents the difference between output and intermediate inputs
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by industry. Income represents the sum of income that is received by all persons from 
all sources. GSP is a comprehensive measure of economic activity in a state. Population 
is the difference between the net natural change (caused by births and deaths) and the 
migration change (REMI, 2011). Because the REMI model is grounded in neoclassical 
economics, the anticipated impacts included are: additional jobs as a result of 
implementing the policy, an increase in labor personnel and real disposable income, an 
increase in the state's population, and an increase in output (sales) that local businesses 
experience as a result of the government buying their products or services.
Description of the Model
The PI+ is flexible and can be customized to account for geographic or regional 
differences in assessing the impacts of economic changes in the target states, cities 
and/or localities (Avalos & Birdyshaw, 2007). In this case, PI+ is customized to be a 
mathematical representation of the South Carolina economy to investigate the impact 
of implementing the procurement preference policies. The dollar amount of the 
preference contracts (industry sales) are input into the PI+ which calculates the total 
changes in output due to the policy changes resulting from the implementation of the 
in-state preference policy.
PI+ uses simulation equations and economic variables. The number of equations 
varies depending on "the extent of industry, demographic, demand, and other details in 
the specific model being used" (REMI, 2007, p. 3). The model integrates four 
methodological approaches: input-output, computable general equilibrium,
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econometric and economic geography methodologies. Each one of these 
methodological approaches has its own strengths and weaknesses if used alone; 
however, the REMI model combines the strengths of each of these approaches into the 
model (REMI, 2007). The four approaches are explained below.
First: input-output model. The REMI model represents "the inter-industry 
relationships found in input-output models. Changes that affect industry sectors that 
are highly interconnected to the rest of the economy will often have a greater economic 
impact than those for industries that are not closely linked to the regional economy" 
(REMI, 2012, para 2).
Second: computable general equilibrium. General equilibrium focuses on the 
balance between supply and demand in an economy with many interacting markets.
The balance occurs in the long run when prices, production, consumption, imports, 
exports, and other changes are in equilibrium and stabilize the economy. "For example, 
if real wages in a region rise relative to the U.S., this will tend to attract economic 
migrants to the region until relative real wage rates equalize". The purpose of general 
equilibrium theory is to help "evaluate changes such as tax policies that may have an 
effect on regional prices and competitiveness" (REMI, 2012, para 3).
Third: econometric model. Econometric model is a tool that economists and 
researchers use "to forecast future developments in the economy" (Hymans, 2008, para 
1). In this model, past relationships among variables are estimated to predict "how 
changes in some variables will affect the future course of others" (Hymans, 2008, para 
1).
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Fourth: economic geography model.
The new economic geography features represent the spatial dimension of the 
economy. Transportation costs and accessibility are important economic 
determinants of interregional trade and the productivity benefits that occur due 
to industry clustering and labor market access. Firms benefit from having access 
to a large, specialized labor pool and from having access to specialized 
intermediate inputs from supplying firms. The productivity and competitiveness 
benefits of labor and industry concentrations are called agglomeration 
economies, and are modeled in the economic geography equations (REMI, 2012, 
para 5).
As shown in Chart 1.1 (page 16), the overall structure of the REMI model consists 
of five major blocks with each block consisting of several economic variables. 
Connections among the variables in each block are represented as linkages within and 
between the five blocks. The blocks and the variables are:
•  Output and demand block (Bl) -  includes output, consumption, investment, 
government spending, real disposable income and export concepts
•  Labor and capital demand block (B2) -  includes labor productivity, labor 
intensity, and the optimal capital stocks.
•  Population and labor force block (B3) -  includes population, migration, 
participation rate, and labor force.
•  Compensation, prices, and costs block (B4) -  includes delivered prices, 
production costs, equipment cost, the consumption deflator, consumer prices, 
the price of housing, and the wage equation
•  Market shares block (B5) -  includes the proportion of local and export markets 
that are captured by each industry.
REMI Simulation
Chart 3.1 illustrates how the policy simulation in the REMI PI+ model works. As 
shown in the figure, a series of steps must be taken to run the simulation. First, the 
researcher formulates the policy question, which in this case is "what are the economic 
impacts of implementing the in-state preference policies?". Second, the researcher
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determines the external variable that represents the effects of the policy (in this case, 
sales that represent the dollar value for the procurement contract). By using the 
baseline value for the variables, the model creates the control forecast (the regional 
forecast). To create the control forecast, REMI PI+ employs the recent available data (i.e. 
2009) for the South Carolina region. Third, the researcher puts the data into the model 
through the policy variable industry sales, which represent the direct effect of the sales 
variable on the economy of the state. Fourth, the model generates an alternative 
forecast. Finally, the impact of the policy variable is measured by comparing the 
alternative and the control forecasts.
Chart (3.1) Policy Simulation
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The case of South Carolina's preference policies for the years 2010 through 2017 
will be the focus of this research. The selection of the state of South Carolina is dictated 
by data availability. The period of this research is eight years; the dollar value of 
procurement contracts for the first three years (2010 -2012) will be input into the PI+. 
REMI cannot run simulations for more than three years in the past because the model 
cannot run simulations in years that have historical data. The Pl+'s last year of history is 
2009. There is a two-year lag in the procurement contracts data because the year must 
first end, and then it takes another year for the sources to compile and report the data. 
The average spending will be calculated and used to forecast the economic impact for 
the years 2013- 2017.
The researcher will employ two types of data in this research. The first type of 
data to be used includes the values of the economic variables, which are represented in 
all the underlying economic linkages, equations and estimated relationships of the 
economic structure in the PI+. These relationships and linkages are built into the 
software, and REMI staff will develop the model and provide the economic data which it 
gathers from various sources. REMI collects primary historical data from various sources 
including the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA), the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS), 
and County Business Patterns (CBP); its national forecast data is collected from BLS 
(forecast data and occupation data) and Research Seminar in Quantitative Economics 
(RSQE) from the University of Michigan.
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In addition to the data set described above, the second type of data the 
researcher will use includes the dollar values of the contracts awarded to South Carolina 
firms given the in-state preference policy. For each contract, the spending (the dollar 
value of the contracts) is compiled into the North American Industry Classification 
System (NAICS) to account for the differential impacts by type of sector, and these 
dollar values will be input into the PI+. The preference data is obtained from the Office 
of Audit and Certification, a subdivision of the Procurement Services Office in South 
Carolina Budget and Control Board, which is the central administrative agency for South 
Carolina state government. The Office of Audit and Certification prepared quarterly 
procurement preference reports which provided the dollar amount of the procurement 
preference contracts.
Each of the quarterly reports also includes the name of the South Carolina 
agencies that have awarded the contracts, the solicitation numbers, descriptions, NIGP 
commodity codes, lowest response amount, award amount, preference expenses, and 
preference categories. All procurement contracts involved the use of invitations for 
competitive sealed bids. The contracts are classified into the following categories: the 
United States end-product preference, South Carolina end-product preference, and 
resident vendor preference. In addition to the commodity/product contract 
preferences, the state offers contract preferences for services that are designated as 
resident contractor preference and resident subcontractor preference (more details 
about the categories are provided in Chapter II).
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Table 3.1 below represents the combined data from the quarterly reports. The 
table shows that in the 2010 fiscal year, 20 competitive sealed bids were awarded by 
agencies in the state of South Carolina using preference policies for a total of 
$1,031,605, while in the 2011 fiscal year 49 competitive sealed bids were awarded by 
agencies in the state of South Carolina using preference policies for a total of 
$1,748,391. In the 2012 fiscal year, 49 competitive sealed bids were awarded by 
agencies in the state of South Carolina using preference policies for a total of 
$1,519,655. The dollar value of each of the 118 contracts will be input in the model 
according to the respective North American Industry Classification System (NAICS) 
industry for each contract. The table also shows that the direct cost of awarding the 
preference contracts is $179,332, meaning that the state agencies paid an extra 
$179,332 to award the contracts based on a variety of preference types. Thirty state 
agencies implemented the in-state preference policies during 2010 and 2012. A list of 
the state agencies is provided in Appendix A.
Table 3.1 Total Number of Contracts Dictated 









2010 $996,375 $1,031,605 $35,230 20
2011 $1,670,035 $1,748,391 $78,355 49
2012 $1,448,731 $1,519,655 $70,924 49
Total $4,484,834 $4,664,166 $179,332 118
54
A Detailed Description of the REMI Model
A South Carolina version of the REMI P1+ model was applied to estimate the 
economic impacts of preference policies on output, personal and real disposable 
income, value added, Gross State Product (GSP), population, and employment in South 
Carolina for 2010 and 2017. Each of the five major blocks is summarized below.
1. Output and Demand (Bl)
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The output and demand block (Chart 3.2) consists of output, demand, 
consumption, investment, government spending, exports, and imports, "as well as 
feedback from output change due to the change in the productivity of intermediate 
inputs" (REMI, 2011, p. 6). Three variables affect the output for each industry in the 
home region: industry demand in all regions in the nation, the home region's share of 
each market, and international exports from the region. In block 5, economic geography 
methods determine the shares of home and other regions' markets. Final demand 
drives the output block. For each industry, the final demand consists of the amount of 
output, consumption, investment, and capital demand on that industry (REMI, 2011). 
The sources of demand are defined below:
■ Output is the amount of production, including all intermediate goods purchased as 
well as value added (compensation and profit). Output also can be thought of as 
sales or supply.
■ Consumption is a function of real disposable income per capita, relative prices, 
differential income elasticities, and population. When population increases, 
consumption increases.
■ Real disposable income drives consumption, which is determined by compensation 
(B4), employment (B2), non-compensation income, and the personal consumption 
expenditure price index. Labor income depends on employment and the 
compensation rate, described in blocks 2 and 4, respectively. Non-compensation 
income includes commuter income, property income, transfers, taxes, and social 
security payments (REMI, 2011).
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■ Investment is "the difference between optimal and actual capital stock for 
residential, non-residential, and equipment investment" (REMI, 2011, p. 9) and it is 
driven by optimal capital stock adjustment process.
■ Government spending is used to provide services for citizens and it is related to 
revenue resources. Government spending depends on population (B3), housing 
prices (B4), and the overall size of the economy (GRP). "The government spending 
equation takes into account regional differences in per capita and per GSP 
government spending, as well as differential government spending levels across 
localities within a larger region" (REMI, 2011, p. 9).
■ The demand for the intermediate inputs is driven by "the requirements of 
industries that use inputs from other sectors. These inter-industry relationships are 
based on the input-output table for the economy" (REMI, 2011, p. 9). The 
intermediate inputs are determined by productivity which is determined by the 
commodity access index.
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2. Labor and Capital Demand (B2)
Chart (3.3): Block 2 Labor and Capital Demand



















The second block (B2) is "the labor and capital demand block" which includes 
employment, labor intensity, labor productivity, and the substitution among labor, fuel 
and capital (Chart 3.3).
■ Employment includes farm, government, and private non-farm employment. 
"Employment in private non-farm industries depends on employment demand 
and the number of workers needed to produce a unit of output. The
58
employment per dollar of output is driven by the national employment per dollar 
of output, the cost of other factors, and the access to specialized workers"
(REMI, 2011, p. 14).
* Labor productivity for each industry depends on "the availability of workers with 
differentiated skills for the occupations used in each industry" which is equal to 
the output per employee (output/employment). Chart 3.3 indicates the 
following relationships: labor productivity is driven by industry employment. 
Industry employment is driven by occupation employment. Occupation 
employment is driven by the labor access index by occupation and industry. The 
index derives labor productivity.
■ Labor intensity: "is determined by the cost of labor relative to the other factor 
inputs, capital and fuel" (REMI, 2011, p. 14). Labor intensity measures the use of 
labor relative to other factors.
■ "The substitution between labor, capital, and fuel is based on a Cobb-Douglas 
production function, which implies constant factor shares. Labor intensity is 
calculated for each industry" (Rose et al., 2010, p. 12).
■ "Demand for capital is driven by the optimal capital stock equation for industries 
and for housing. The optimal level of capital is determined for non-residential 
structures and equipment for each industry. The regional optimal capital stock is 
based on the industry size measured in capital-weighted employment terms, the 
cost of capital relative to labor, and a measure of the optimal capital stock on the 
national level. (REMI, 2011, p. 14).
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■ The optimal level of capital for residential housing is determined by the real 
disposable income in the region relative to the nation, the optimal residential 
capital stock for the nation, and the price of housing.
3. Population and Labor Force (B3)
Chart (3.4): Block 3 Population and Labor Supply
Relative 
R iilC o m p . 





(3) Population Labor Supply
4. The Em ploym ent 
to  Potential Labor 
Fores
6. P artic ipation Rato
3. Potential 
Labor Fores
1. Econom ic 
M igration
Commodity Employment Relative Real
Aeoess Opportunity Comp.
Index E/LF Rate





Population, labor force, participation rate, and migration equations are the 
components of the third block, "the population and labor supply", as shown in Chart 
3.4. Generally, this block gives demographic information about the region and it consists 
of the following:
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Population is available by age, gender, and ethnic category, with birth and 
survival rates for each group. Populations for every year equal the net natural 
change (caused by births and deaths) and the migration change (migration 
occurs for economic and non-economic reasons) to the previous year's 
population(REMI, 2011).
Migration includes retirement, military, international, and economic migration", 
and it varies widely across population groups. It is measured/ determined by " 
the relative real after-tax compensation rate, relative employment opportunity, 
and consumer access to variety" (REMI, 2011, p. 6). The model assumes that the 
changes in migration are not caused by any changing regional economic 
conditions.
Labor force includes unemployed and employed workers. Labor force 
participation rate is "thus the proportion of each population group that is 
working or looking for work" (REMI, 2011, p. 16). Labor supply is determined by 
the size and labor force participation rate of each group. 'These participation 
rates respond to changes in employment relative to the potential labor force and 
to changes in the real after-tax compensation rate. Demand for labor from block 
2 and labor force supply from block 3 interact to determine compensation 
(wage) rates (REMI, 2011).
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4. Compensation, Prices and Costs (B4)
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The compensation, prices, and costs block (B4) consists of consumer prices, 
housing prices, and composite wages and input costs, composite prices, determinants of 
production costs, the consumption price deflator, and the compensation equation 
(Chart 3.5). Compensation, prices, and costs are "determined by the labor and housing 
markets". The labor market is central to the regional economy, and compensation
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differences are the primary source of price and cost differentials between regions" 
(REMI, 2011, p. 14). Demand for labor (B2) and labor force supply (B3) interact to 
determine compensation rates. Housing prices depend on changes in population density 
and changes in real disposable income. The components are discussed below.
■ Composite prices are derived by the production costs of supplying regions, 
the effective distance to these regions, and the index of access to the variety 
of outputs in the industry relative to the access by other uses of the product 
(REMI, 2011).
■ Determinants of production costs are the cost of labor, capital, fuel, and 
intermediate inputs. Labor costs "reflect a productivity adjustment to 
account for access to specialized labor, as well as underlying compensation 
rates" (REMI, 2011, p. 17). Capital costs include costs of non-residential 
structures and equipment, while fuel costs incorporate electricity, natural 
gas, and residual fuels.
■ Composite compensation rate is determined by the labor access index from 
block 2 as well as the nominal compensation rate.
■ The composite cost of production depends on the productivity-adjusted 
compensation rate of the region, costs of structures, equipment, and fuel, 
and the delivered price of intermediate inputs (REMI, 2011).
■ "The consumption deflator converts industry prices to prices for 
consumption commodities" (REMI, 2011, p. 17).
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Compensation changes are due to changes in the labor supply and demand 
conditions and changes in the national compensation rate. Changes in employment 
opportunities relative to the labor force and occupational demand changes determine 
the compensation rates by industry (REMI, 2011).
5. Market Shares (B5)











The last block is "the market shares block" which includes the proportion of 
local, inter-regional, and export markets captured by each region, so the block 
represents "the ability of the region to sell its output within the local region, to other 
regions in the nation, and to other nations"(REMI, 2011, p. 17). This block is affected by
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three factors: "relative production costs, the estimated price elasticity of demand, and 
the effective distance between the home region and each of the other regions" (REMI, 
2011, p. 18). Change in a product's quantity (output) and price (production cost) 
compared with other competitors drives the change in share of a specific area in any 
region (Chart 3.6).
When prices increase (production cost), market shares will be lower. A higher 
quantity (output) raises market shares. "Market shares rise with output increases, since 
higher output is better able to meet local and other regions' demand for goods and 
services by providing more choices". "The share of local and external markets then 
drives the exports from and imports to the home economy" (REMI, 2011, p. 18).
This chapter discussed the rationales for choosing REMI PI+ to estimate the 
impact of South Carolina's in-state preference policies on the economy of the state. In 
addition, the chapter presented a description of the data to be analyzed as well as the 




Chapter III presented an overview of the REMI model, a REMI simulation, data, 
and a detailed description of the REMI model. The purpose of Chapter IV is to present 
the data analysis and report the results. This chapter is divided into five sections: data 
preparation, profiles of state government agencies, industries benefiting from 
procurement contracts, preference types, and economic impact results. The chapter 
concludes with a summary of the information presented.
Data Preparation
The procurement contracts awarded to South Carolina firms given the in-state 
preference policy were carefully examined in detail to prepare the data for the analysis. 
The total number of the contracts was 124, but 6 contracts were dropped from the data 
because 1) the available data was not sufficient to identify the correct industry, 2) a 
public purchasing officer deemed the data provided on the preference reports was not 
accurate or 3) the dollar value of the contracts was very low (more details regarding 
these cases are provided in Appendix B).
Prior to inputting the dollar values of the 118 contracts into the REMI model, the 
dollar value (the spending) for each contract was classified into the North American 
Industry Classification System (NAICS). The purpose of the classification is to account for
the differential economic impacts on output (business sales), total employment 
(includes the private non-farm employment), personal income, real disposable personal 
income, Gross State Product (GSP), value added, and state's population by the type of 
industry. To identify the respective industry, the South Carolina Procurement Services 
Office provided the following data: the solicitation numbers, the solicitation 
descriptions, the National Institute of Governmental Purchasing (NIGP) commodity 
codes, and preference categories.
The appropriate NAICS industry was identified in three ways. First, the 
description of each contract was compared with the detailed description of the NAICS 
numbering system provided on the NAICS website. The two descriptions were then 
matched to identify the most appropriate industry code. Second, since the 
corresponding NIGP code for every contract is provided, the NIGP code staff helped to 
convert the NIGP codes to NAICS codes. Third, the NIGP code staff provided the 
researcher online access to the description of NIGP codes to help identifying NAICS.
After identifying the appropriate NAICS industry, the researcher reviewed each 
contract's description and matched it with the description of NIGP codes. The NIGP 
codes were then matched with the NAICS codes. During the process of identifying the 
NAICS codes, the type of preference that the state agency applied to every contract was 
taken into consideration. For example, if the preference type is resident vendor 
preference, the sales from the specific contract contribute to the wholesale trade 
industry or retail industry. But, if the preference type is resident vendor and South 
Carolina end-product, the sales from the specific contract contribute to the
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manufacturing industry because the product is manufactured in the state of South 
Carolina.
After identifying the NAICS by each approach, the corresponding NAICS codes 
were compared. In a few cases, there were disagreements on the identified NAICS 
codes. In these cases, the researcher checked the South Carolina Budget and Control 
Board website to find more details about the specific solicitations. If the information 
was not available on the website, the researcher either emailed or called the state 
agency that awarded the contracts, provided the solicitation numbers and asked for 
more details about the specific contract to help determine the appropriate industry. 
(Appendix C includes additional information regarding these cases.)
Profile of State Government Agencies
There are ninety-five state agencies in the government of the state of South 
Carolina. These agencies represent a variety of organizations, such as educational 
institutions like Clemson University and the University of South Carolina, government 
departments such as the Department of Transportation and the Department of Parks, 
Recreation and Tourism, and commissions like the Public Service Commission and Arts 
Commission. Nearly 30% of the state agencies implemented the in-state preference 
policies within the period of 2010-2012. The types of preferences include Resident 
Vendor, South Carolina End Product, Resident Vendor and South Carolina End Product, 
Resident Vendor and US End Product, Resident Contractor, and Resident Contractor and
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Subcontractor(s). The next section provides more information about the percentages of 
each type of preference policy implemented by the state agencies.
Chart 4.1 identifies the names of the top thirteen state agencies that 
implemented the preference policies. For the most part, vendors claimed a variety of 
preferences when they bid on higher education institutions' contracts. For example, 
Clemson University bought fire equipment and protective gear, a Polaris Ranger Vehicle, 
and materials for repairing a floor. The University of South Carolina installed computer 
servers, provided a switchgear for the Eugene Stone Stadium, and bought surveillance 
cameras for the Law Enforcement and Safety Department. Lander University bought 
emergency phone towers for campus and mattresses for residence halls, and printed 
view books for their colleges. Coastal Carolina University bought treadmills and 
requested landscaping services and printing of the winter issue of the alumni magazine.
In addition to higher education institutions, other government agencies 
implemented the state preference policies within the period of 2010-2012. The 
Transportation Department awarded a contract to buy safety vests, total stations, and 
multimeters; the Public Safety Department awarded a contract to a resident vendor to  
provide janitorial services and to buy golf carts; the Parks, Recreation and Tourism 
Department awarded a contract based on resident vendor and South Carolina product 
to buy heat pumps for Givhans Ferry State Park and playground equipment for Lake 
Wateree State Park; the South Carolina Department of Juvenile Justice awarded a 
resident contractor a solicitation for maintenance and repair of generators.
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Chart (4.1): State Agencies that Implemented the In-State Preference Policies (2010-2012)
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Profile of Preference Types 
Chart 4.2 shows the type of preference policies that vendors claimed when 
South Carolina agencies sent invitations for bid within the three-year period from 2010- 
2012. As mentioned in Chapter II, South Carolina has two types of preferences: 
commodity contract preferences and service contract preferences. The commodity 
contract preferences are the preferences claimed by South Carolina vendors because 
they sell or manufacture a product in the state. The service contract preferences are 
preferences claimed by South Carolina vendors because they provide services in the 
state. The commodity contract preferences include the United States end-product 
preference, South Carolina end-product preference, and resident vendor preference. In 
addition to the commodity/product contract preferences, the state offers contract 
preferences for services that are designated as resident contractor preference and 
resident subcontractor preference. As shown in Chart 4.2, thirty-four percent of the 
vendors claimed that they qualified for resident vendor and South Carolina end-product 
preference, which means that their products are sold by South Carolina vendors and are 
made, manufactured, or grown in South Carolina. Twenty-seven percent of the vendors 
proved that they qualified for resident vendor preference policy. Twenty-seven percent 
represents 28 contracts awarded to South Carolina vendors. Twenty-nine percent of the 
contracts were awarded based on resident vendor and US end product. Chart 4.2 also 
shows that there were few contracts (less than 6% of the contracts) awarded based on 
resident contractors and subcontractors preferences and South Carolina end-product 
preferences.
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Profile of Industries Benefiting from Procurement Contracts
As mentioned before, the dollar values of the contracts were assigned according 
to the NAICS codes. After identifying the corresponding NAICS industries for the 118 
contracts, eight industries that benefited from the procurement contracts that were 
awarded based on preference policies were identified. Table 4.1 (page 77) shows the 
names of the eight industries, the average of the dollar spending during 2010-2012 and 
the number of contracts that were awarded based on the preferences by industry. 
(Appendix D includes NAICS descriptions of the industries that were involved in this 
research). For clarifying purposes, Chart 4.3 (page 78) is also a visual representation of 
the dollar values of the top industries benefiting from procurement contracts. The eight 
industries are: retail trade, construction, administrative and support services, 
manufacturing, wholesale trade, professional, scientific, and technical services, 
transportation and warehousing, and other services (except public administration).
As a result of awarding preference contracts, state government agencies spent 
the most on the wholesale trade industry (an average of $657,248). According to the 
NAICS, "the Wholesale Trade sector comprises establishments engaged in wholesaling 
merchandise, generally without transformation, and rendering services incidental to the 
sale of merchandise" (NAICS, 2013, par 4). For example, in 2010, the Transportation 
Department awarded a contract to a South Carolina vendor to buy safety vests. The 
extra sales from the safety vests contributed to the wholesale trade industry. In 2012, 
Lander University awarded a nearly $18,000 contract to a South Carolina vendor to buy
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theater lighting fixtures and lamps. The $18,000 sale added to the wholesale industry. 
The University of South Carolina bought cameras for its Law Enforcement and Safety 
Department from a resident vendor for $29,000. A total of forty-one contracts (35%) 
were attributed to the wholesale trade industry within the three-year period.
The second highest sector benefiting from procurement contracts is the 
manufacturing sector. Forty-two contracts were awarded to buy a South Carolina end- 
product that was made, manufactured, or grown in South Carolina. According to the 
South Carolina Procurement Office, "Made means to assemble, fabricate, or process 
component parts into an end product, the value of which, assembly, fabrication, or 
processing is a substantial portion of the price of the end product. Manufactured means 
to make or process raw materials into an end product. Grown means to produce, 
cultivate, raise, or harvest timber, agricultural produce, or livestock on the land, or to 
cultivate, raise, catch, or harvest products or food from the water which results in an 
end product that is locally derived from the product cultivated, raised, caught, or 
harvested"(South Carolina Budget and Control Board, 2009, p. 2).
Chart 4.4 (page 79) shows the names of the twelve manufacturing sectors and 
the percentage of total number of contracts that contributed to the various 
manufacturing industries. The twelve sectors are: miscellaneous manufacturing, printing 
and related support activities, computer and electronic product manufacturing, 
electrical equipment and appliance manufacturing, machinery manufacturing, furniture 
and related product manufacturing, other transportation equipment manufacturing, 
fabricated metal product manufacturing, primary metal manufacturing, paper
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manufacturing, wood product manufacturing, and petroleum and coal products 
manufacturing.
Thirty- nine percent of the manufacturing contracts were attributed to the 
miscellaneous manufacturing industry. For example, Midlands Technical College 
awarded a contract to buy dental workstations and dental equipment. The value of the 
contract was nearly $200,000, and it contributed to the dental equipment and 
instruments manufacturing (miscellaneous manufacturing). The second highest 
manufacturing sector benefiting from procurement contracts was printing and related 
support activities. The Health and Environmental Control Department hired a resident 
vendor to print WIC food guide booklets. The contract, valued at $21,000 ,was 
attributed to the printing industry. In 2011, the University of South Carolina awarded a 
contract to furnish and deliver Symetrix SymLink digital audio devices for $16,500. The 
sales contributed to the computer and electronic product-manufacturing sector. In 
another example, in 2011, Francis Marion University bought portable concession stand 
stations for $26,304, and this contributed to the furniture and related product 
manufacturing.
For the construction industry, state governments awarded 15 contracts that 
were based on preference policies for an average of $330,469. The Vocational 
Rehabilitation Department awarded a contract to a South Carolina vendor for a loading 
dock area and paving improvements/repairs. In this case, the additional sales were 
added to the construction industry. In 2011, Juvenile Justice contracted with a resident 
contractor for dorm demolition, and this service was considered a contribution to the
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construction industry. The Transportation Department also awarded a $12,000 contract 
to a resident vendor to install concrete piles.
In 2011, Trident Technical College awarded a contract to a resident vendor to 
buy multimeters for $225, and the dollar value contributed to the retail sector. Coastal 
Carolina University awarded a contract to hire a resident contractor for landscaping 
services and paid $12,000. This contract contributed to the administrative and support 
services industry. Midlands Technical College spent nearly $20,000 for data processing, 
computer programming and software services by awarding the contract to a resident 
vendor.
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Table (4.1): Profile of Industries Benefiting from Procurement Contracts





Wholesale Trade $657,248 41
Manufacturing $412,090 42
Construction $330,469 15
Administrative and Support and Waste Management and Remediation Services $67,122 8
Professional, Scientific, and Technical Services $55,962 6
Retail Trade $17,456 3
Other Services (except Public Administration) $14,897 2
Transportation and Warehousing $10,994 1
Total $1,566,239 118
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Chart (4.3): The Percentage of Procurement Contracts by Industry
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Chart (4.4) Manufacturing Sector
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The Economic Impact Results
The researcher used the REMI PI+ 1.5.2, 70-sector, 1-region, model of the South 
Carolina economy to perform the impact study of the in-state preference policies. There 
are two main steps to study the effect of the preference policies on the economy and to 
obtain the results from REMI PI+. First, REMI Inc. developed the South Carolina version 
of the REMI PI+ model by using historical, estimated and forecasted data. The South 
Carolina REMI PI+ model contains the baseline value for all the economic indicators, 
which represents the values of the indicators without implementing the preference 
policy. Second, for each contract, the corresponding NAICS industry was determined, 
and the dollar values of the contracts were added to the model. Entering the dollar 
values of the contracts represents a shock in the economy and creates the alternative 
forecast for the model. The alternative forecast represents the value of the economic 
indicators when implementing the policy.
For each year, the difference between the baseline value and the alterative 
forecast represents the quantitative impact of the in-state preference policies (but 
without considering policy costs). If the difference between the baseline value and the 
alterative forecast is positive, the preference policies have a positive impact on the 
economy. If the difference between the baseline value and the alterative forecast is 
negative, the preference policies have a negative impact on the economy. If the 
difference between the baseline value and the alterative forecast is zero, the preference 
policies have no impact on the economy of South Carolina.
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The study uses seven economic indicators to measure the impact of the 
preference policies. These indicators are: total employment (includes the private non­
farm employment), output (business sales), value added, Gross State Product (GSP), 
personal income, real disposable personal income, and state's population.
After running the simulation, which is presented in detail in Chapter III, the 
results can be viewed in three different formats in the model. Each format represents a 
unique way to read the results. The discussion below consists of a combination of the 
three formats.
1. Difference: viewed as a numeric difference relative to the other forecast. In this 
research, difference represents the numeric difference between the baseline 
values (the control forecast) and the alternative forecast. Table 4.2 shows the 
results in "Difference" format.
2. Levels: gives the ability to view the actual numeric values for all the variables in 
the model. In this view, the numeric values for all the economic indicators with 
and without implementing the preference policies are provided. Charts 4.5, 4.6, 
4.8, 4.10-4.14 illustrate the behavior of the main economic indicators. It is critical 
to mention that the above charts are drawn using 3-D line formatting, and the 3- 
D rotating is zero for the X and Z axis and ten for the Y axis. Also, the chart 
perspective is ten. This type of formatting is used in order to show more clearly 
the small economic impacts of the in-state preference policies on the state 
economy.
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3. Percentage Change: viewed as a percentage change relative to another forecast 
(alternative forecast % change compared to control forecast). Chart 4.15 shows 
the change in the economic indicators as a percentage of the estimated baseline.
The total quantitative impact of implementing the preference policies on the 
economic indicators is shown in Table 4.2. The increase or decrease in employment, 
personal income, GSP, output, value added and real disposable income measures the 
economic impact. All values in the table are positive which indicates an increase in the 
economic indicators as a result of implementing the preference policies. For the 
employment variable, the numeric values represent how many extra jobs are added to 
the economy. For GSP, output and real disposable income indicators, the numeric values 
represent how many extra dollars are added to the economy as a result of 
implementing the preference policies. The next section provides more details about 
each economic indicator.
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Table (4.2): Difference in Economic Indicators Compared to the Baseline Values
Variable Units 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017
Total of the 
Differences
Total Employment Jobs 14 18 24 18 17 16 15 14 135
Private Non-Farm 
Employment
Jobs 12 16 21 16 15 14 13 12 119
Output/ Sale Millions 1.526 2.289 2.960 2.197 2.106 2.045 1.984 1.953 17.06
Personal Income Millions 0.595 0.839 1.175 0.961 0.961 0.992 1.007 0.992 7.52
Real Disposable 
Personal Income
Millions 0.473 0.626 0.824 0.626 0.671 0.656 0.626 0.641 5.14
Gross State Product Millions 0.900 1.389 1.724 1.328 1.251 1.221 1.221 1.190 10.22
Value Added Millions 0.916 1.389 1.724 1.328 1.266 1.236 1.221 1.190 10.27




REMI PI+ defines employment as "the number of jobs, full-time plus part-time, 
by place of work. Full-time and part-time jobs are counted at equal weight. Employees, 
sole proprietors, and active partners are included, but unpaid family workers and 
volunteers are not included" (REMI, 2013b, par 44). REMI adapted the Bureau of 
Economic Analysis's (BEA) definition of employment. According to the BEA's definition, 
the additional jobs "represented the number of "roster slots" available from business or 
government at the prevailing wage conditions during a time period". So, the definition 
of employment is a "labor demanded" concept rather than an idea of "how many 
people have a job" at a moment." (REMI, 2013a, p. 11).
Due to the sales increase from implementing in-state preference policies, 
employment is anticipated to increase above the baseline. In the REMI PI+ model, sales 
(output) and employment are connected because output influences private non-farm 
employment. As shown in Table 4.2, increased sales contributed 14,18 and 24 jobs in 
2010, 2011, & 2012 to the economy of the state. The total increase in employment 
within the next 5 years (2013- 2017) is 79 job-years greater than the baseline. REMI 
estimates that there are 135 more job-years available and occupied than in the baseline 
during the 8 years of the study. Table 4.2 also shows that on average more than 80% of 
the additional jobs were added to private industries.
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It is critical to emphasize the importance of interpreting the employment results 
correctly; the total employment in 2010 is 14 jobs greater than the baseline values. 
These jobs might be 14 new jobs starting in 2010 or 14 "more people have a job (when 
accounting for people who work multiple jobs or commute in or out of [South Carolina] 
for work), but it did mean there was more work in the state to such degree" (REMI, 
2013a, p. 11).
Chart 4.5 shows the total employment impact to South Carolina between 
implementing and not implementing preference policies. The dashed line shows the 
total number of jobs in the state of South Carolina without implementing the preference 
policies. The solid line shows the total number of jobs in the state of South Carolina with 
implementing the preference policies. When South Carolina government agencies 
award preference contracts to South Carolina firms, the sales of the firms increase, and 
they need to hire more workers to increase production. For South Carolina the extra 
dollars generated additional jobs in the state. Furthermore, Chart 4.6 compares private 
non- farm employment before and after implementing the preference policies.
In addition to the number of jobs, the model provides employment by industry- 
level within the private non-farm sector. Chart 4.7 shows that workers were able to 
work in the occupations demanded mainly by the following industries: construction, 
manufacturing, retail trade, wholesale trade, professional, scientific, and technical 
services, and administrative and waste management services. Twenty-five percent of 
the private non-farm jobs are in the construction industry, and 23% of the private non­
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Year 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017
Preferences not Implemented 2,456,727 2,482,612 2,514,458 2,547,123 2,601,657 2,662,013 2,720,121 2,782,518
Preferences Implemented 2,456,741 2,482,630 2,514,481 2,547,140 2,601,673 2,662,029 2,720,135 2,782,532
The Difference 14 18 24 18 17 16 15 14
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Year 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017
Preferences not Implemented 2,001,572 2,060,787 2,072,744 2,134,076 2,170,684 2,230,337 2,304,104 2,361,583
Preferences Implemented 2,001,585 2,060,803 2,072,765 2,134,092 2,170,699 2,230,351 2,304,118 2,361,596
The Difference 13 16 21 16 15 14 14 13
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Chart (4.7): Total Jobs by Industry
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Output is "the sum of output for private non-farm industries, state and local 
government, federal civilian, federal military, and farm sectors" (REMI, 2013b, par 150). 
It is basically the additional sales or total production that was generated within the state 
because preference policies were implemented when awarding the contract to state 
vendors. The results show that when the contracts were awarded to in-state vendors, 
the sales /output for some industries increased by $1.5 million in 2010 over the baseline 
simulation (the sales without implementing the preference policies), and are predicted 
to continue to increase on average by $2.1 million for each year from 2010 until 2017 
(see Table 4.2).
Chart 4.8 shows that the output impact for a variety of industries increased after 
implementing preference policies. The dashed line shows the total output in the state of 
South Carolina without implementing the preference policies. The solid line shows the 
total output in the state of South Carolina with implementing the preference policies. In 
2012, industry sales were $307,221 billion (the baseline value); after implementing the 
preference policies, the output was $307,224 billion. Therefore, the increase was 
estimated to be around three million dollars in 2012. The total increase in sales within 
the eight-year period is expected to be around $17 million.
As shown in Chart 4.9, the benefits of implementing the preference policies were 
concentrated in the industries related to wholesale trade, construction, and 
manufacturing. Sales in the wholesale trade industry increased the most during the 
eight years because of implementing the preference policies; it increased by $5.2 million
and represents 33.5% of the sales increase. While manufacturing and construction sales 
increased by 25% and 17% respectively during the eight-year period, all other sectors 
showed a sales increase of less than 6%. The other industries in Chart 4.9 represent 
management of companies and enterprises, arts, entertainment and recreation, 
educational services, forestry, fishing and related activities, and mining.
90
Chart (4.8): Sales/ Output




2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017
Year 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017
Preferences not Implemented (Billions) 293.651 296.48007 307.2211 311.8501 325.9454 338.1832 347.6796 360.4442
Preferences Implemented (Billions) 293.6525 296.48236 307.22406 311.8523 325.9475 338.1852 347.6816 360.4462
The Difference (Millions) 1.526 2.289 2.96 2.197 2.106 2.045 1.984 1.953
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Chart (4.9): Sales by Industry

























Value added represents " a measure of the contribution of each private industry 
and of government to a region's Gross Domestic Product"(REMI, 2013b, par 238). It 
represents the difference between industry's gross output (sales, commodity taxes and 
inventory change) minus its intermediate inputs (energy, raw materials, semi-finished 
goods and services that are purchased from domestic industries or from foreign 
resources). Demand affects the value added variable, so the value added variable 
increases as a result of an increase in demand. As Table (4.2) shows value added 
increased by $.91, $1.4, $1.7, and $1.3 million for the years 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013 
respectively, and increased by $1.2 million for the years 2014-2017. The state gained 
$10.27 million in value added when implementing the preference policies.
Chart 4.10 shows the value added variable over the eight-year period. The 
dashed line shows the total value added in the state of South Carolina without 
implementing the preference policies. The solid line shows the total value added in the 
state of South Carolina with implementing the preference policies. The value added 
increased on average by $1.3 million yearly. In 2012, the value added baseline was 
$172.4546 billion and the alternative forecast was $172.4563 billion, so the difference 
between the baseline and the forecast represented the impact of implementing the 
preference policies; in this case, the difference for 2012 was $1.7 million.
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Chart (4.10): Value Added




2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017
Year 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017
Preferences not Implemented (Billions) 165.215 166.5946 172.4547 175.0365 182.723 189.6905 195.4979 203.0837
Preferences Implemented (Billions) 165.216 166.596 172.4564 175.0378 182.7243 189.6917 195.4991 203.0849










4. Gross State Product (GSP):
GSP represents "a comprehensive measure of economic activity in a state, and 
can provide important information about regional economic health" (Weber, 1979, p. 
217). As Table (4.2) shows, in 2011, the economic impact of the in-state preference 
increased South Carolina GSP by $1.4 million. In 2012, the preference policies 
contributed $1.7 million to GSP, which equals a 0.15% increase in GSP. When 
government awards the contracts to in-state vendors and buys their products, the 
demand for the products increases and as a result the GSP increases. The total 
estimated impact of the policy on GSP from 2010- 2017 is the summation of the 
difference between the baseline values and the alternative forecast values over the 
eight years of study. In this case, the sum of the impacts from 2010 through 2017 for 
GSP is $10.22 million.
Chart 4.11 shows the GSP impact in South Carolina from implementing the 
preference policies. The change in GSP is similar to the change in employment. The 
difference between the dashed line (the baseline) and the solid line (the alternative 
forecast) represents the impact of the preference policies. When South Carolina 
government agencies award the preference contract to a South Carolina vendor, the 
extra dollars generated a positive impact in the state in terms of GSP.
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Chart (4.11): Gross State Product




2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017
Year 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017
Preferences not Implemented (Billions) 165.21506 166.5946 172.45467 175.03647 182.72302 189.69046 195.49791 203.08374
Preferences Implemented (Billions) 165.21596 166.59599 172.45639 175.0378 182.72427 189.69168 195.49913 203.08493













Personal Income represents the "Income received by persons from all sources. It 
includes income received from participation in production as well as from government 
and business transfer payments. It is the sum of compensation of employees (received), 
supplements to wages and salaries, proprietors' income with inventory valuation 
adjustment (IVA) and capital consumption adjustment (CCAdj), rental income of persons 
with CCAdj, personal income receipts on assets, and personal current transfer receipts, 
less contributions for government social insurance" (REMI, 2013b, par 154). As Table 4.2 
illustrates, on average personal income increased by one million dollars. In total, $7.52 
million was added to the economy as a result of implementing the preferences. Chart 
4.12 shows the personal income associated with implementing the preference policies 
in South Carolina. It follows the same trend as employment. When South Carolina 
government agencies award a preference contract to a South Carolina vendor, the extra 
dollars generate more personal income.
6. Real Disposable Income:
Real disposable income reflects "total after-tax income received by persons; it is 
the income available to persons for spending or saving" (REMI, 2013b, par 169). Since 
output increases along with a rise in employment, real disposable personal income is 
estimated to increase. As a result of implementing the in-state preference, the annual 
real disposable personal income was estimated to increase about $5.14 million during 
the years 2010 and 2017 (Table 4.2). Chart 4.13 shows trends similar to the personal 
income variable.
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Chart (4.12): Personal Income




2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017
Year 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017
Preferences not Implemented (Billions) 159.3149 160.5865 168.1624 175.0125 184.8191 195.1712 205.9677 216.744
Preferences Implemented (Billions) 159.3155 160.5874 168.1635 175.0134 184.82 195,1721 205.9687 216.745
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Chart (4.13): Real Disposable Personal Income




2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017
Year 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017
Preferences not Implemented (Billions) 132.9223 132.2074 136.1657 139.1683 144.3791 149.6527 154.8765 159.6263
Preferences Implemented (Billions) 132.9227 132.2081 136.1665 139.1689 144.3798 149.6533 154.8771 159.6269












"Population reflects mid-year estimates of people, including survivors from the 
previous year, births, special populations, and three types of migrants (economic, 
international, and retired)" (REMI, 2013b, par 158). Workers might relocate if they find a 
job with higher wages somewhere else and migrate from one area to another. As Table 
(4.2) shows, the population of the state increased by only seven people in 2011 as a 
result of implementing the preference policies. With time, more people might move to 
the state; three people moved to the state in 2010 and an additional 19 people are 
expected to move in 2017. On average, population is predicted to increase by 
approximately 13 people yearly.
Chart 4.14 shows the population of the state variable over the eight-year period. 
The dashed line shows the population in the state of South Carolina without 
implementing the preference policies. The solid line shows the population of the state 
with implementing the preference policies. The population increased on average by 13 
people yearly. For example, in 2016, the population is estimated to be 4,850,119 and 
the forecast was 4,850,138. The difference between the baseline and the forecast 
represents the number of people who might relocate to the state to work in jobs as a 
result of implementing the preference policies, and in this case, that is 19 people. 
Therefore, along with the economic impacts associated with job growth, income, value 
added, and GSP, it is estimated that there would be a small effect on the state's 
population.
Chart (4.14): Population




Year 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017
Preferences not Implemented 4,710,761 4,716,497 4,743,732 4,753,723 4,785,595 4,817,618 4,850,120 4,891,435
Preferences Implemented 4,710,765 4,716,503 4,743,745 4,753,737 4,785,611 4,817,635 4,850,138 4,891,454
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Chart (4.15) presents the percentage change of the main economic indicators in this 
study. As mentioned earlier in this chapter, the percentage change for every variable 
represents the percentage changes from the baseline values. These percentages indicate the 
extent to which the economic indicators increased, decreased, or remained the same as a result 
of implementing the preference policies. They also indicate if the impacts on the economy are 
considered large or small compared to the baseline. As shown in Table (4.2), implementing the 
preference policies contributed positively to the economy of the state. However, as shown in 
Chart (4.15), the percentage changes are relatively small.
The trend of the percentage impact is similar for all the economic indicators. The 
percentage impact increased in 2010 and 2011 and reached the highest percentage (.001%) in 
2014, but then the percentage decreased for all the economic indicators, except for the state's 
population, until 2017. For example, the percentage change in employment variable was nearly 
.0006% in 2010, increased to .001% in 2012 and decreased to .0005% by 2017. Except for the 
state's population, the percentage impacts on personal income and real disposable income 
were lower than the other economic indicators. The percentage impact was around .0004% for 
the eight-year period, except in 2012 when it was around .0006%.
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S u m m ary
The previous sections in this chapter presented the results of this economic 
impact study. The impact is measured by the differences in the values of economic 
indicators with and without implementing the preference policies. Because the impact 
of the preference policies differs by industry, the sales (the dollar value of the contracts) 
are compiled into the North American Industry Classification System (NAICS), and then 
the dollar value of the contracts (output/ sales) awarded to South Carolina firms given 
the in-state preference policy was input into the model. REMI reported seven main 
economic indicators: employment, output/sales, personal income, real disposable 
income, Gross State Product (GSP), value added, and state's population.
As a result of implementing the in-state preference, 135 job-years are estimated 
to be added to the South Carolina economy with more than 80% of these jobs added to 
the private non-farm industries. Most of the jobs are in the construction (25%), 
wholesale trade (23%), and manufacturing (14%) industries. Real disposable personal 
income is estimated to increase by $5.14 million between 2010 and 2017, and the South 
Carolina economy is estimated to gain $10.22 million in GSP from 2010 through 2017. 
Sales are estimated to increase on average by $2.1 million from 2010 through 2017 
(total $17 million). The sales benefits were concentrated in industries related to 
manufacturing, wholesale trade, construction, and administrative support services. The 
state gained $10.27 million in value added when implementing the preference policies.
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Even though these benefits are relatively small compared to the size of South 
Carolina's economy, they outweigh the $179,332 of preference costs, which represent 
the extra dollars that government pays when they award the contracts based on 
preferences. In conclusion, the results showed that the values of the economic 
indicators are positive and represent the estimated contributions to the state economy.
Chapter IV presented details of how the sales from 118 contracts were classified 
within the NAICS system as well as a detailed explanation of the profiles of state 
government agencies, industries benefiting from procurement contracts, and the 
various preference types. The chapter concluded with a presentation of the values of 




This research examined the impact of in-state preference policies on the 
economy of South Carolina. Chapter IV discussed the data preparation, reported the 
profiles of state government agencies, preference types, and industries benefiting from 
procurement contracts, and presented the results of the economic impact on the state 
economy. The economic impact is measured using seven indicators: output (business 
sales), total employment (includes the private non-farm employment), real disposable 
personal income, Gross State Product (GSP), value added, personal income, and state's 
population. This chapter reports a summary of the research and the research results and 
presents study implications, limitations and delimitations of the study, and future 
research.
Summary of the Research
State governments have adopted a variety of procurement preference policies to 
achieve a variety of social, political and economic goals. This study focused on the 
economic goals by investigating the economic impact of implementing in-state 
preference policies on the economy of South Carolina. In-state preference policies 
promote state businesses and help them remain in their home state. According to 
economic theory, as a result of adding extra money to the economy, the preference
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policies would generate more jobs and an increase in production, sales, income and 
population. To investigate the benefits of implementing the preference policies, 
international trade theory was used as a guiding framework in this study.
Within the context of international trade, governments provide social, political, 
and economic arguments to justify their intervention in trade. Reviewing the literature 
revealed that the rationale for adopting procurement preference policies in the 
domestic context is similar to the rationale presented in support of government 
intervention in international trade. A significant amount of research has investigated the 
impact that protectionist instruments such as tariffs, import quotas, subsidies, and 
formal policies might have on a country's economy and trade, but the results from the 
research were not consistent. Deardorff and Stern (1981) and Lowinger (1976) used 
input-output models to analyze the impact of discriminatory policies on the economy of 
U.S., U.K. and EU member countries; Baldwin (1982), Breton and Salmon (1996) and 
Herander (1982) used supply-demand equations to estimate the impact of the Buy 
American Act on imports, output, and domestic prices, and a computable general 
equilibrium model was used by Herander (1982) to investigate the impact of 
government price discrimination and tariffs. Scholars showed that protectionist 
instruments might have some benefits to the economy, but there are costs associated 
with these benefits, and most of the time, the benefits are not large enough to 
outweigh the costs.
107
Within the state context, state governments enact in-state preference policies 
hoping to help their own economy by increasing economic growth and bringing 
economic benefits to the state. However, there is a lack of research to prove these 
economic benefits. This research attempted to provide empirical evidence by answering 
the following research question: what are the impacts of implementing the in-state 
procurement preference policies on the economy of the state of South Carolina?
To estimate the economic impact of the South Carolina preference policies on 
the state economy, the Regional Economic Model Policy Insight (REMI PI+) was utilized 
in this study. REMI PI+ represents a traditional way to measure the impact of a variety of 
policies and programs. REMI PI+ consists of embedded mathematical equations that 
explain the relationships and the linkages among a variety of economic variables. The 
embedded relationships within these models trace the economic impacts generated by 
increasing sales as a result of implementing preference policies.
The REMI model is composed of three main components, which economists have 
used separately in impact studies involving international trade. Since trade theory was 
used as an overarching theory in this research, it seemed appropriate to select REMI as 
a research tool. Moreover, many scholars, researchers, practitioners and professionals 
from several private, public and nonprofit organizations have used REMI PI+ for over 
thirty years. Scholars have applied REMI to study a variety of policy issues at the state 
level. For example, Florida state used the model to investigate the impacts of the Florida 
Energy and Climate Change Action Plan (FECCAP) on the state's economy (Rose & Wei, 
2012) while in Michigan, the model was used to analyze the macroeconomic impact of
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the Michigan Climate Action Plan (Miller et al., 2010). Pennsylvania used the model to 
evaluate the impacts of the Pennsylvania Climate Action Plan on the state's economy for 
the period of 2009-2020 (Rose et al., 2011). However, although the repeated use of the 
model overtim e has established confidence in its reliability, there are some limitations 
in its use. These limitations are discussed later in this chapter.
In this study, South Carolina's version of the PI+ was applied to analyze the 
economic impacts of in-state preference policies on the economy of the state from 2010 
through 2012 and to forecast the trends from 2013 to 2017. The overall structure of the 
REMI PI+ is divided into five major blocks, namely, output and demand, labor and capital 
demand, population and labor force, wages, prices, and profits, and market shares. The 
economic impacts were determined by measuring the most commonly reported 
economic indicators: output (business sales), total employment (includes the private 
non-farm employment), personal income, real disposable personal income, Gross State 
Product (GSP), value added, and state's population.
Two types of secondary data were used: 1) the values of the economic variables 
which were represented in all the underlying economic linkages, equations and 
estimated relationships of the economic structure in the PI+. This data were collected 
from the Bureau of Economic Analysis, the Bureau of Labor Statistics, and County 
Business Patterns. 2) quarterly procurement preference reports. The Procurement 
Services Office in South Carolina provided quarterly procurement preference reports 
each of which included the names of the South Carolina agencies that have awarded the
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contracts, the solicitation numbers, descriptions, NIGP commodity codes, lowest 
response amount, award amount, preference expenses, and preference categories.
To measure the economic indicators, REMI PI+ factors in the specific industry 
that each contract complies with, and therefore, the industry sector for each contract 
was identified to comply with NAICS. The dollar values of the contracts were added to 
the model before the researcher ran the simulation and generated the results. The 
results are presented in detail in the previous chapter, and they are presented briefly in 
the next section of this chapter.
Summary of the Results
This study assessed the economic impact of in-state preference policies using 
REMI PI+. A customized version of REMI PI+ model was developed for the state of South 
Carolina. Before running REMI, the researcher analyzed not only the profile of state 
government agencies that implement preference policies but also the preference types 
that were claimed by the vendors as well as the industries benefiting from procurement 
contracts.
Almost 31% of South Carolina government agencies have implemented the 
preference policies, and they award contracts mainly to buy products and services 
related to wholesale trade, manufacturing, and construction. Vendors, when bidding on 
contracts, claimed a variety of preference policies. Thirty-four percent of the vendors 
claimed that they qualified for resident vendor and South Carolina end-product
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preference. Twenty-seven percent of the vendors proved that they qualified for the 
resident vendor preference policy and twenty-nine percent of the contracts were 
awarded based on resident vendor and US end product. Less than 6% of the contracts 
were awarded based on resident contractor and subcontractor preferences and South 
Carolina end- product preferences.
The results from running the REMI model represent the quantitative difference 
between the baseline values and the alternative forecast values. The baseline values 
show the numerical values of the economic indicators before implementing the in-state 
preference policies. The alternative forecast values show the numerical values of the 
economic indicators after implementing the in-state preference policies. The difference 
between the baseline forecast and the alternative forecast could be positive, negative, 
or zero. If the difference is positive, implementing the in-state preference policies 
contributes positively to the state economy. If the difference is negative, implementing 
the in-state preference policies hurts the state economy, and if the difference is zero, 
implementing the in-state preference policies has no impact on the state economy.
Table (4.2) showed the expected amount of increase in the economic indicators 
due to the simulated economic shocks. The shock represents the extra sales that were 
added to the economy as a result of implementing the preference policies. The 
economic impact of implementing preference policies was $17 million in total industry 
output (sales) over 8 years. On average the output increased by $2.1 million from 2010 
until 2017. In terms of sales, the wholesale industry's output increased the most 
compared with the other industries (34%). The manufacturing and construction
i l l
industries accounted for 25% and 17 % of total sales and the value-added impact was 
$10.27 million dollars.
Implementing preference policies also impacted total employment which 
increased by 135 job-years. Eighty percent of those total jobs (119 jobs) were in private 
industries, and they mainly appeared in the construction, wholesale trade, 
manufacturing, and administrative and waste management industries. The construction 
and wholesale trade industries were the largest component in terms of employment (30 
jobs and 27 jobs respectively) followed by the manufacturing, and administrative and 
waste management industries (17 and 13 jobs respectively). Over 100 people were 
predicted to relocate to the state within the next 8 years and should that be the case 
there could be a gain of $5.14 million in real disposable personal income.
Policy Implications
The results of this study showed that the numeric values of the economic 
indicators, which are GSP, employment, personal income, real disposable income, 
state's population, value added, and output, all increased when the state implemented 
the in-state preference policies. It is important to discuss the implications of 
implementing the preference policies on South Carolina, however, this research does 
not support a specific decision related to in-state preference policies for South Carolina.
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The findings have important implications for voters, taxpayers, public 
administrators, and policy makers. Voters and taxpayers are concerned about the 
effective use of their money by government. They want government to do great things 
for them and the society (Dye, 2012). Governments have the obligation to maximize the 
use of taxpayers' money, and in the case of in-state preference policies, governments 
spend more money when they award these policies. Citizens want to be informed about 
the impact of paying the extra money and have enough knowledge to understand 
government actions. The results from this study can help voters and taxpayers keep an 
eye on the impact of preference policies.
Furthermore, policymakers frequently enact policies to address an issue but, not 
in all cases, can they predict the consequences of implementing the policy. This study 
might help policymakers to confirm the need to continue the policy, to stop 
implementing the policy, and/ or to change the policy to make it more beneficial. The 
positive results indicate that the preference policies are beneficial to the state, but the 
volume/scale of the impacts could be large or small depending on the cost of 
implementing the preference policies. Policymakers and public officials should give 
more attention to the costs associated with implementing the preference policies, and 
they must find a balance between the benefits and the costs of preference policies since 
both issues are legitimate policy concerns.
This research starts the process of filling the gap in the literature by adding 
research related to preference policies to the body of knowledge of public procurement. 
Scholars confirmed the importance of analyzing preferences on many occasions. Qiao et
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al. (2009, p. 397) mentioned that "the practical impact of preferences is worthy of much 
more analysis". Professional organizations and government officials also discussed 
preference policies and emphasized the need for more research-based answers to the 
benefits of preference policies. For example, "NASPO believes that more research and 
cost-benefit analysis studies are warranted to gauge success rates and gains, if any, or 
failures of preference programs and policies, including whether any state has realized 
any direct or indirect cost benefit or loss as a result due to a specific preference"
(NASPO, 2012, p. 3). In addition, in its report on in-state preference policy in its 
procurements, the Connecticut Department of Administrative Services (2012, p. 6) 
stated that "[Preferences data] may be useful in the future in making a determination 
as to the economic impact of state contracting and any proposed policy changes in this 
area". These statements warn of the emergent need to have more data available 
regarding in-state preference policies in order to contribute to a better understanding of 
preference policies. This consideration is another implication of this study.
Since the economic impacts of preference policies on the South Carolina 
economy are shown by industry-level, the results give state agencies the opportunity to 
identify the sectors that state agencies want to support when they implement the 
preferences. In conclusion, the results from this study have shown that implementing 
preference policies does help the state economy, and the results provide the knowledge 
base for policymakers, voters and taxpayers in determining whether or not to adapt in­
state preference policies.
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Limitations o f the Research
Limitations are the factors that weaken the research and are out of the 
researcher's control to a certain extent. Creswell (2005, p. 198) defined limitations as 
the "potential weaknesses or problems with the study identified by the researcher". The 
researcher acknowledges such limitations to this study because they may have had the 
potential to influence the interpretation of the results, and they will be described below.
This research is limited in its results for several reasons. First, the results from 
this research cannot be generalized to other states because it focused on one state, 
South Carolina. In addition, REMI Inc. has provided access to PI+ for the state of South 
Carolina for the purpose of this research; however, due to lack of funding, it was not 
possible to purchase additional versions of the model. A second limitation is that the 
accuracy of the data collected from the Office of Audit and Certification, a subdivision of 
the Procurement Services Office in South Carolina Budget and Control Board, and the 
values of all the variables embedded in the REMI PI+ model cannot be verified. Third, 
this analysis does not factor in the effect of reciprocal policies on South Carolina 
vendors when they bid on contracts in states that apply the reciprocal policies. The 
negative effects of these reciprocal policies could be negative because South Carolina 
vendors might lose the opportunity to do business in the state that applies the 
reciprocal policy. Fourth, the economic costs (except the direct cost of preferences) of 
implementing the preference policies were not analyzed in this study. Identifying the 
costs and comparing them with the in-state preferences' benefits might impact the
conclusions of this study. Fifth, since the study is an economic impact study, there is no 
attempt made to assess the social benefits gained from the preference policies.
In addition to the above limitations, there are also others, which are related to 
the REMI model itself. Since the model represents a variety of equations and 
relationships, it is possible that it could be viewed as a black box by those who are not 
familiar with the model. However on their website, REMI has provided users with their 
documents to review all underlying assumptions and the data sources on their website. 
Finally, given the way the REMI model is built, it can only provide impact for three years 
(2010 - 2012) because it does not run simulations in years with actual historical data 
(the last year of historical data is 2009).
Delimitations of this Research
Delimitations are defined by Plichta and Garzon (2009, p. 15) as the "boundaries 
in which the study was deliberately confined". This research is confined to one state 
only and does not attempt to study the rest of the twenty-four states that implement in­
state preference policies, and this constitutes a delimitation of this study. This study is 
also confined by an eight- year time frame and does not examine beyond the prescribed 
period. A final delimitation of this research is that it is confined to the twenty-nine state 
agencies that implemented in-state preferences policies and does not try to examine all 
of the contracts implemented by all South Carolina state agencies.
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Future Research
This research examined the economic benefits from implementing in-state 
preference policies in South Carolina by measuring quantitative changes in the 
economic indicators. The results showed that the value of the indicators increased when 
they are compared to the baseline value for each year for the state of South Carolina. 
The results have established a foundation for future investigations in five areas of 
research.
Since, there are 25 (including South Carolina) states which implement in-state 
preference policies, and since every state has its own unique demographics, industries, 
and economy, this leads to future investigation to explore the economic impacts of the 
preference policies on each of the 24 states applying in-state preferences. Some 
researchers and government officials have expressed the need to investigate the impact 
of in-state preferences; for example, the Connecticut Department of Administrative 
Services (2012), emphasized the importance of investigating the impact of Connecticut 
state preference policies. In addition, Moreland (2012) prepared a report for NASPO 
about in-state preference policies, and he highlighted the need to study the impact of 
preferences. "NASPO believes that more research and cost-benefit analysis studies are 
warranted to gauge success rates and gains, if any, or failures of preference programs 
and policies, including whether any state has realized any direct or indirect cost benefit 
or loss as a result due to a specific preference" (Moreland, 2012, p. 3).
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In addition to an investigation into the impacts of preference policies on the 
other 24 states, a comparative study to further understand the differences and the 
similarities of the impact of in-state preference policies on the states' economies would 
raise new questions and stimulate further discussion. Comparing the economic impact 
between the 25 states will add a new perspective to the analysis and stands as a topic 
for future research.
This study also highlighted the need to investigate reciprocal preferences. The 
reciprocal preference laws add a percentage to the out-of-state vendors when their own 
states impose preferences on out-of-state vendors, effectively working in the opposite 
direction of in-state preference policies. According to NASPO's survey in 2012, thirty- 
five states apply reciprocal preference laws to achieve equal treatment for their 
interested vendors against the bidders who get preference treatm ent in their own 
states. If twenty-five states implement in-state preference policies and thirty-five states 
implement reciprocal policies, it might mean that there are some states implementing 
both policies. It is critical to understand why these states would implement the two 
policies which work against each other, and this is considered to be another area for 
future research.
Obviously, there are other costs related to implementing the in-state preference 
policies and these costs might outweigh the benefits from implementing the in-state 
preference policies. Some of the costs include the opportunity costs that governments 
could have lost by not awarding the contracts to out-of-state vendors, the 
administrative costs related to managing the contract and determining the eligibility to
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award the contracts, and costs related to reciprocal policies on South Carolina vendors. 
At this time, the data that is related to these costs is either not available or is not 
measured. This lack of study of the costs of implementing preferences creates another 
important area for future research.
Finally, although REMI is considered to be one traditional approach used to 
measure the economic impact of a variety of policies, scholars and researchers have 
used other types of input-output models and other methods to measure the economic 
impact of implementing preferences. Scholars have used ordinary least squares 
regression to study the impact of policies on the states' or localities' economy, and 
others have used the Regional Input-Output Modeling System (RIMS). Future research 




2009 Act No. 72. (2009). Preferences Law. from
http://procurement.sc.gov/webriles/MMO PREFS/Main/2009 Act 72 %28S.116 
%29.pdf
Achille. (2011). Brief Guide to Public Sector European Union Procurement Legislation. 
Oxon, UK: Achille Information Limited
Audet, D. (2002). Government procurement: A synthesis report. OECD Journal on 
Budgeting, 2(3), 149-194.
Avalos, A., & Birdyshaw, E. (2007). Assessing the Economic Impact o f a Local 
Preference Ordinance in the City of Fresno.
Baldwin, R. (1982). The political economy of protectionism Import competition and 
response (pp. 263-292): University o f Chicago Press.
Baldwin, R., & Richardson, J. D. (1972). Government Purchasing Policies, Other NTBs, 
and the International Monetary Crisis. Ottawa: Carleton School of International 
Affairs.
Bates, T. (2001). Minority business access to mainstream markets. Journal o f  Urban 
Affairs, 23(1), 41-56.
Boffa, M., & Olarreaga, M. (2012). Protectionism during the crisis: Tit-for-tat or chicken- 
games? Economics Letters.
Breton, A., & Salmon, P. (1996). Are discriminatory procurement policies motivated by 
protectionism? Kyklos, 49(1), 47-68.
Bureau of Economic Analysis. (2013). Real GDP by State. Retrieved from:
http://www.bea.gov/newsreleases/regional/gdp state/gsp newsrelease.htm
Bureau of Labor Statistics. (2013). South Carolina at Glance. Retrieved from: 
http://www.bls.gov/eag/eag.sc.htm
Cassing, S., & Giarratani, F. (1992). An evaluation o f the REMI model for the south 
coast air quality management district. Environment and Planning A, 24, 1549- 
1549.
Census of Bureau. (2013). South Carolina Quick Facts. Retrieved from: 
http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/states/45000.html
Chambers, B. B. (1991). Looking Back at City o f Richmond v. JA Croson Co.: Its Effects 
on State and Local Set-Aside Programs. BYU Law Review, 1633.
Connecticut Department o f Administrative Services. (2012). Report on in-state 
preference policy in State Procurement.
Cox, A., & Furlong, P. (1995). European procurement rules and national preference:
explaining the local sourcing of public works contracts in the EU in 1993. Journal 
o f  Construction Procurement, 1(2), 87-99.
Creswell, J. W. (2005). Educational Research: Planning, Conducting, and Evaluating 
Quantitative and Qualitative Research. Upper Saddle River, NJ: Pearson
De Silva, D. G., Dunne, T., Kosmopoulou, G., & Lamarche, C. (2011). Disadvantaged
Business Enterprise Goals in Government Procurement Contracting: An Analysis 
o f Bidding Behavior and Costs. Federal Reserve B a m ko f Cleveland.
Deardorff, A. V., & Stern, R. M. (1981). A disaggregated model o f  world production and 
trade: An estimate o f the impact of the Tokyo Round. Journal o f  Policy Modeling, 
3(2), 127-152.
120
Deltas, G., & Evenett, S. (1997). Quantitative estimates of the effects of preference
policies. Law and Policy in Public Purchasing. University o f  Michigan Press, Ann 
Arbor, 73-92.
Dye, T. R. (2012). Understanding public policy. Pearson.
Enchautegui, M. E., Fix, M. E., Loprest, P. J., Lippe, S. C. V. D., & Wissoker, D. A. 
(1997). Do Minority-Owned Businesses Get a Fair Share o f Government 
Contracts? Washington, D.C.: The Urban Institute.
Erridge, R., Fee, A., & Mcllroy, J. (1998). European Union public procurement policy 
and electronic commerce: problems and opportunities. European Business 
Review, 98(5), 252-259.
European Commission. (2004). A report on the functioning of public procurement
markets in the EU: benefits from the application of EU directives and challenges 
for the future (pp. 1-24).
Federal Reserve Economic Data. (2013). Per Capita Personal Income in South Carolina 
(SCPCPI).
Feik, J. (2013). Economic Profile -  South Carolina: The Federal Reserve Bank of 
Richmond
Ferrini, L. (2012). What are the Main Causes and Effects of Economic Protectionism? 
Retrieved from http://www.e-ir.info/2012/08/28/the-causes-and-effects-of- 
economic-protectionism/
Frederickson, H. G. (1990). Public administration and social equity. Public 
administration and law, 209.
Gelderman, C. J., Ghijsen, P. W., & Brugman, M. J. (2006). Public procurement and EU 
tendering directives - explaining non-compliance. International Journal o f Public 
Sector Management, 19(1), 702-714.
Gordon, H., Rimmer, S., & Arrowsmith, S. (1998). The economic impact of the European 
Union regime on public procurement: lessons for the WTO. The World Economy, 
21(2), 159-187.
Green, R. (1993). Human Rights and Most-Favored-Nation Tariff Rates for Products 
from the People's Republic of China. U. Puget Sound L. Rev., 17, 611.
Gregg, I., & Karen, O. C. (1990). Minority Set-Aside Programs in the State After City of 
Richmond The Journal o f  Federalism.
Hefner, F. (1996). State Procurement Preferences: Evaluating their Economic Benefit.
The Journal o f  State Government, 69(1), 33-38.
Herander, M. (1982). The Impact o f Government Price Discrimination and Its
Equivalence with the Tariff. Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv, 118(3), 525-545. doi: 
10.2307/40439053
Hickok, S. (1985). The consumer cost o f US trade restraints. Federal Reserve Bank o f  
New York Quarterly Review, 10(2), 1-12.
Hill, C. W. L. (2011). Global Business Today. New York, NY: McGraw-Hill/Irwin.
Hoekman, B. (1998). Using international institutions to improve public procurement. 
World Bank Research Observer, 13(2), 249.
Hufbauer, G. C., Berliner, D. T., & Elliott, K. A. (1986). Trade protection in the United 
States: 31 case studies: Institute for international economics Washington, DC.
Hymans, S. H. (2008). Forecasting and Econometric Models, from
http://www.econlib.org/librarv/Enc/ForecastingandEconometricModels.html
121
Jensen, K. (2011). Assessing the Use o f  Local Preferences in Local Government
Contracting. (Master of Public Administration), The University o f North Carolina 
at Chapel Hill.
Krasnokutskaya, E., & Seim, K. (2008). Bid preference programs and participation in 
highway procurement auctions. American Economic Review.
Krueger, A. O. (1991). Government failures in development: National Bureau of 
Economic Research.
Krugman, P. R., & Obstfeld, M. (1991). International economics: Trade and policy: 
Harper Collins Publishers, New York.
Lowenstein, H. (2011). Economic development through local vendor preference policy: 
the case of Horry County, South Carolina. The Coastal Business Journal, 10( 1).
Lowinger, T. C. (1976). Discrimination in government procurement of foreign goods in 
the US and Western Europe. Southern Economic Journal, 451-460.
MacManus, S. A., Watson, S. A., & Blair, D. C. (1992). Doing business with
government: Federal, state, local & foreign government purchasing practices fo r  
every business and public institution: Paragon House Publishers.
Madsen, P. T. (2002). Re-opening the debate on the lack o f impact o f EU-tenders on the 
openness o f public procurement. Public Procurement Law Review(5), 265-281.
Marion, J. (2007). Are bid preferences benign? The effect o f small business subsidies in 
highway procurement auctions. Journal o f  Public Economics, 97(7-8), 1591- 
1624.
Martin, J. M. F. (1996). The EC public procurement rules: a critical analysis: Clarendon 
Press Oxford.
McAfee, R. P., & McMillan, J. (1989). Government procurement and international trade 
Journal o f  International Economics (Vol. 26, pp. 291-308).
McCrudden, C. (2007). Buying Social Justice-Equality, Government Procurement & 
Legal Change. New York.
McCue, C. P., & Gianakis, G. A. (2001). Public Purchasing: Who’s Minding the Store? 
Journal o f  Public Procurement, 7(1), 71-95.
Miller, S., Wei, D., & Rose, A. (2010). The economic impact of the Michigan climate 
change Action Plan on the state’s economy. Washington, DC: the Michigan 
Department of Environmental Quality, The Center for Climate Strategies.
Moreland, E. (2012). In-state Preferences. NASPO.
NAICS. (2013). Introduction to NAICS. from http://www.census.gov/eos/www/naics/
NASPO. (2012). 2011-2012 NASPO Survey o f State Procurement Practices Summary 
Report.
Nielsen, J. U., & Hansen, L. G. (2001). The EU Public Procurement Regime-Does It 
Work? Intereconomics, 36(5), 255.
OECD. (2011). Public Procurement in the EU: Legislative Framework, Basic Principles 
and Institutions.
OUSTR. (2012). WTO Government Procurement Agreement, from
http://www.ustr.gov/trade-topics/govemment-procurement/wto-govemment-
procurement-agreement
Pitzer, J. T., & Thai, K. V. (2009). Introduction to Public Procurement Herndon: 
National Institute of Governmental Purchasing. Inc.
122
Plichta, S. B., & Garzon, L. S. (2009). Statistics for nursing and allied health: Lippincott 
Williams & Wilkins.
Pregelj, V. N. (2001). Most-favored-nation Status o f  the People's Republic o f  China.
Qiao, Y., Thai, K. V., & Cummings, G. (2009). State and local procurement preferences: 
a survey Journal o f  Public Procurement, 9(3 & 4), 371-410.
Reinert, E. S. (1999). The role of the state in economic growth. Journal o f  economic 
Studies, 26(4/5), 268-326.
REMI. (2007). REMI Policy Insight User Guide.
REMI. (2011). REMI PI+ Model Document, from http://www.remi.com
REMI. (2012). The REMI Model, from http://www.remi.com/the-remi-model
http://www.remi.com/products/pi
REMI. (2013a). Contrast: Modeling The Macroeconomic Impact Of “ Medicaid 
Expansion ” In North Carolina.
REMI. (2013b). REMI Glossary, from http://www.remi.com/resources/glossary
REMI. (n.d.). What does REMI say?
Rice, M. F. (1991). Government set-asides, minority business enterprises, and the 
Supreme Court. Public Administration Review, 114-122.
Rickman, D. S., & Schwer, R. K. (1995). A comparison of the multipliers o f IMPLAN, 
REMI, and RIMS II: Benchmarking ready-made models for comparison. The 
Annals o f  Regional Science, 29(4), 363-374.
Rodriguez, H., & Houston, D. (2007). Procurement Matters: The Economic Impact of 
Local Suppliers: Civic Economics Center.
Rolfstam, M. (2008). Public procurement o f  innovation: Centre for Innovation, Research 
and Competence in the Learning Economy (CIRCLE), Lund University.
Rose, A., & Wei, D. (2012). Macroeconomic Impacts o f the Florida Energy and Climate 
Change Action Plan. Climate Policy, 72(1), 50-69.
Rose, A., Wei, D., & Dormady, N. (2011). Regional macroeconomic assessment of the 
Pennsylvania Climate Action Plan. Regional Science Policy & Practice, 357-379.
Rose, A., Wei, D., & Prager, F. (2010). Impacts o f climate policy on the California 
economy. San Francisco, California: Next 10.
Shafaeddin, M. (2000). What did Frederick List actually say? Some clarifications on the 
infant industry argument: United Nations Conference on Trade and Development.
Short, J. E. (1992). Issues in public purchasing: a guidebook fo r  policymakers: Council 
o f State Government.
Snider, K. F., & Rendon, R. G. (2008). Public procurement policy: implications for 
theory and practice Journal o f  Public Procurement, 8(3), 310-333.
South Carolina Budget and Control Board. (2009). Frequently Asked Questions From 
The Vendor's Perspective, from
http://procurement.sc.gov/webfiles/MMO PREFS/Main/FAO Preferences.htm
Strayer, C. (2011). Local Preference, from
http://www.citvofmiddletown.org/docs/council/12202011 w.pdf
Svara, J. H., & Brunet, J. R. (2004). Filling in the Skeletal Pillar: Addressing Social 
Equity in Introductory Courses in Public Administration. Journal o f  Public 
Affairs Education, 10(2), 99-109.
Tarr, D. G., & Morkre, M. E. (1984). Aggregate costs to the United States o f tariffs and 
quotas on imports: general tariff cuts and removal o f  quotas on automobiles,
123
steel, sugar, and textiles: an economic policy analysis: Federal Trade 
Commission, Bureau of Economics.
Thai, K. V. (2001). Public procurement re-examined. Journal o f  Public Procurement, 
7(1), 9-50.
The Economist. (2009). The nuts and bolts come apart, as global demand contracts, trade 
is slumping and protectionism rising from 
http://wvyAV.economist.com/node/13362027
The South Carolina Department o f Commerce Research Division. (2010). South Carolina 
Economic Indicator Report.
Treyz, G. I., Rickman, D. S., & Shao, G. (1991). The REMI economic-demographic
forecasting and simulation model. International Regional Science Review, 14(3), 
221-253.
Trionfetti, F. (1999). Trade and Public Procurement: The Perspective o f Small Open 
Economies. London, UK: International Trade Center
Trionfetti, F. (2000). Discriminatory public procurement and international trade. The 
World Economy, 23(1), 57-76.
Vitner, M., & Silverman, S. (2013). South Carolina 2013 Economic Outlook: Game 
Changers, Catalysts and Hurdles
Ward, A. (2000). Most Favored Nation Status: China.
Weber, R. E. (1979). A Synthesis o f Methods Proposed for Estimating Gross State 
Product. Journal o f  Regional Science, 19(2), 217-229. doi: 10.1111/j. 1467- 
9787.1979.tb00587.x
Wood, G. E., & Mudd, D. R. (1978). The recent US trade deficit-no cause for panic. 
Federal Reserve Bank o f  St. Louis Review( Apr), 2-7.





LIST OF SOUTH CAROLINA STATE AGENCIES
1. Clemson University
1. Trident Technical College
2. Medical University of South Carolina
3. Coastal Carolina University
4. Juvenile Justice
5. Midlands Technical College
6. University of South Carolina
7. Parks, Recreation and Tourism
8. Health and Environmental Control
9. Materials Management Office
10. Transportation Department
11. Educational Television Commission
12. Aiken Technical College
13. Budget and Control Board
14. Education Lottery
15. Greenville Technical College
16. Winthrop University
17. Spartanburg Technical College
18. College of Charleston
19. Lander University
20. Piedmont Technical College
21. Central Carolina Technology
22. South Carolina Technical College
23. Northeastern Technical College
24. Spartanburg Community College
25. Public Safety
26. Natural Resources
27. Francis Marion University
28. The Adjutant General of South Carolina
29. The South Carolina Department of Mental Health
Appendix B
DROPPED PROCUREMENT CONTRACTS
A total of six contracts were dropped from the analysis for a variety of reasons. 
The Parks, Recreation and Tourism Department awarded a contract based on resident 
vendor and South Carolina end-product preferences which means that the vendor is a 
resident of the state and produces the product in the state as well. The description of 
the contracts is "Propane Gas for South Carolina States Parks-Line 2 (Santee)" and the 
product in this case is "the gas". The value of the contract is $25. This solicitation was 
dropped from the analysis for two reasons. First, from the contract description it is not 
clear if the vendor produces the gas itself in the state or not. The researcher attempted 
to contact the Parks, Recreation and Tourism Department but failed to get a response. 
Second, the dollar value of the contract is small compared to the value of the other 
contracts.
The remaining five contracts were dropped from the analysis because errors 
were discovered in the reports. Two of these contracts were for Trident Technical 
College. According to the preference report, both contracts were for computer software 
for microcomputers, and they were awarded based on preference type 2 (SC end 
product), but the Procurement Department confirmed that the two contracts were 
awarded based on US end product only. In this case, these contracts are not relevant to 
this study. The other three contracts were for Greenville Technical College to buy 
Surgical Instruments & Cases, Self Contained Breathing Apparatus, and Welding
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Machines. According to Greenville Technical College's Procurement Office, in two of the 
contracts the resident SC vendor provided the lowest bid and the preference laws were 
not applicable/ relevant in these awards, and in the third contract the resident vendor 
was the only vendor to submit a bid, and the preference policies were not relevant.
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Appendix C
PROBLEMS IDENTIFYING NAICS CODES
1. South Carolina Department of Mental Health
In 2012, the South Carolina Department of Mental Health awarded a contract
based on preference type 5 (Resident Vendor and US End Product). The description of
the contract includes "Blast Cook-Chiller", which didn't provide enough information to
identify the industry. Bid document for this solicitation was downloaded from the South
Carolina Budget and Control Board website, and the description of the contract was:
"Item Description: Hurrichill Blast Chiller, Model #BCIP or equal, Roll-in, remote 
refrigeration, (80) 12 x 20 x 2 1/2" or (40) 18"x 26" pan capacity, 500 lbs. from 160 F to 
38 F blast chill capacity/ 90min., solid state electronic control panel with VFD display and 
alarms, two food probes, s/s interior and exterior, UL listed for safety & sanitation to 
NSF standards."
According to the description above, the South Carolina Department of Mental 
Health bought the Blast Cook-Chiller from the resident vendor in 2012. Therefore, the 
dollar value of this solicitation contributed to the wholesale industry.
2. University of South Carolina
The researcher contacted the Purchasing Department at the University of South 
Carolina to request more information regarding three solicitations. The description of 
the first solicitation is "storage server", and it was awarded based on the preference 
type 4 (Resident Vendor and South Carolina End Product). The description provided 
doesn't give sufficient information to determine the NAICS industry, so in this case, it
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was not clear whether the vendor sells the storage servers and produces them in the 
State because the vendor was qualified for preference type 4. If the vendor sells the 
product only, the sales from this contract are attributed to the retail or wholesale 
industry. If the vendor sells and produces the product, the sales from this contract are 
attributed to the Computer servers manufacturing. The Purchasing Department of the 
University of South Carolina clarified that the vendor installed the storage server (this is 
why the vendor was qualified for the resident vendor preference), and sold the storage 
server which was assembled, fabricated or processed in the state.
The description of the second solicitation is "Music Instruments", and it was awarded 
based on the preference type 1 (Resident Vendor). In this case, the information 
provided is not sufficient to identify the correct NAICS. Upon the researcher's request, 
the Purchasing Department of the University of South Carolina sent the solicitation 
documents. The solicitation description is "Furnish and Deliver New Music 
Instruments". This description identifies that the correct NAICS for this solicitation is 
wholesale industry.
The description of the third solicitation is "Symetrix Digital Audio Devices", but 
the NIGP code is a service code (communications and media related services). This 
solicitation was awarded based on preference type 2 (SC End Product). The Purchasing 
Department of the University of South Carolina sent the solicitation document and the 
more detailed description was "Furnish and Deliver Symetrix SymLink Digital Audio 
Devices". Since the preference is type 2, this solicitation contributes to the computer 
and electronic product manufacturing.
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3. Clemson University
'In 2012, Clemson University awarded a contract and the description
is "YMCA Fence Replacement", but the provided NIGP code is service code (roadside,
grounds, recreational and park area services). The solicitation was awarded based on
the preference type 4 (Resident Vendor and South Carolina End Product). In this case,
since the category is 4, it could indicate that the awarded company produced the fence
and provided the service offence replacement. According to the information provided
by the Procurement Services Office at Clemson University, this solicitation was awarded
based on preference type 5 (Resident Vendor and US End Product), and it should have
been broken into two lines (material and labor). In this case, the NAICS industry is
Electrical Equipment, Appliance, and Component Manufacturing.
This is the response from the Procurement Services Office at Clemson University:
"Ideally we would have broken it out in two lines - one for material and one for 
labor. Since it was not bid that way but price/scope consisted of both, it appears the 
buyer applied the preference based on what they believed or understood to be the 





The Wholesale Trade sector comprises establishments engaged in wholesaling 
merchandise, generally without transformation, and rendering services 
incidental to the sale of merchandise. The merchandise described in this sector 
includes the outputs of agriculture, mining, manufacturing, and certain 
information industries, such as publishing. The wholesaling process is an 
intermediate step in the distribution of merchandise. Wholesalers are organized 
to sell or arrange the purchase or sale of (a) goods for resale (i.e., goods sold to 
other wholesalers or retailers), (b) capital or durable nonconsumer goods, and 
(c) raw and intermediate materials and supplies used in production.
Wholesalers sell merchandise to other businesses and normally operate from a 
warehouse or office. These warehouses and offices are characterized by having 
little or no display of merchandise. In addition, neither the design nor the 
location of the premises is intended to solicit walk-in traffic. Wholesalers do not 
normally use advertising directed to the general public. Customers are generally 
reached initially via telephone, in-person marketing, or by specialized advertising 
that may include Internet and other electronic means. Follow-up orders are 
either vendor-initiated or client-initiated, generally based on previous sales, and 
typically exhibit strong ties between sellers and buyers. In fact, transactions are
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often conducted between wholesalers and clients that have long-standing 
business relationships.
This sector comprises two main types of wholesalers: merchant wholesalers that 
sell goods on their own account and business-to-business electronic markets, 
agents, and brokers that arrange sales and purchases for others generally for a 
commission or fee.
(1) Establishments that sell goods on their own account are known as wholesale 
merchants, distributors, jobbers, drop shippers, and import/export merchants. 
Also included as wholesale merchants are sales offices and sales branches (but 
not retail stores) maintained by manufacturing, refining, or mining enterprises 
apart from their plants or mines for the purpose of marketing their products and 
group purchasing organizations (e.g., purchasing and selling goods on their own 
account). Merchant wholesale establishments typically maintain their own 
warehouse, where they receive and handle goods for their customers. Goods are 
generally sold without transformation, but may include integral functions, such 
as sorting, packaging, labeling, and other marketing services.
(2) Establishments arranging for the purchase or sale of goods owned by others 
or purchasing goods, generally on a commission basis are known as business-to- 
business electronic markets, agents and brokers, commission merchants, 
import/export agents and brokers, auction companies, group purchasing 
organization (e.g., purchasing or arranging for the purchases of goods owned by 
others), and manufacturers' representatives. These establishments operate from
132
offices and generally do not own or handle the goods they sell.
Some wholesale establishments may be connected with a single manufacturer 
and promote and sell the particular manufacturers' products to a wide range of 
other wholesalers or retailers. Other wholesalers may be connected to a retail 
chain, or limited number of retail chains, and only provide a variety of products 
needed by that particular retail operation(s). These wholesalers may obtain the 
products from a wide range of manufacturers. Still other wholesalers may not 
take title to the goods, but act as agents and brokers for a commission.
Although, in general, wholesaling normally denotes sales in large volumes, 
durable nonconsumer goods may be sold in single units. Sales of capital or 
durable nonconsumer goods used in the production of goods and services, such 
as farm machinery, medium- and heavy-duty trucks, and industrial machinery, 
are always included in wholesale trade.
Construction
The Construction sector comprises establishments primarily engaged in the 
construction of buildings or engineering projects (e.g., highways and utility 
systems). Establishments primarily engaged in the preparation of sites for new 
construction and establishments primarily engaged in subdividing land for sale as 
building sites also are included in this sector.
Construction work done may include new work, additions, alterations, or 
maintenance and repairs. Activities of these establishments generally are 
managed at a fixed place of business, but they usually perform construction
activities at multiple project sites. Production responsibilities for establishments 
in this sector are usually specified in (1) contracts with the owners of 
construction projects (prime contracts) or (2) contracts with other construction 
establishments (subcontracts).
Establishments primarily engaged in contracts that include responsibility for all 
aspects of individual construction projects are commonly known as general 
contractors, but also may be known as design-builders, construction managers, 
turnkey contractors, or (in cases where two or more establishments jointly 
secure a general contract) joint-venture contractors. Construction managers that 
provide oversight and scheduling only (i.e., agency) as well as construction 
managers that are responsible for the entire project (i.e., at risk) are included as 
general contractor type establishments. Establishments of the "general 
contractor type" frequently arrange construction of separate parts of their 
projects through subcontracts with other construction establishments. 
Establishments primarily engaged in activities to produce a specific component 
(e.g., masonry, painting, and electrical work) of a construction project are 
commonly known as specialty trade contractors. Activities of specialty trade 
contractors are usually subcontracted from other construction establishments, 
but especially in remodeling and repair construction, the work may be done 
directly for the owner of the property.
Establishments primarily engaged in activities to construct buildings to be sold 
on sites that they own are known as for-sale builders, but also may be known as
134
speculative builders or merchant builders. For-sale builders produce buildings in 
a manner similar to general contractors, but their production processes also 
include site acquisition and securing of financial backing. For-sale builders are 
most often associated with the construction of residential buildings. Like general 
contractors, they may subcontract all or part of the actual construction work on 
their buildings.
There are substantial differences in the types of equipment, work force skills, 
and other inputs required by establishments in this sector. To highlight these 
differences and variations in the underlying production functions, this sector is 
divided into three subsectors.
Subsector 236, Construction of Buildings, comprises establishments of the 
general contractor type and for-sale builders involved in the construction of 
buildings. Subsector 237, Heavy and Civil Engineering Construction, comprises 
establishments involved in the construction of engineering projects. Subsector 
238, Specialty Trade Contractors, comprises establishments engaged in specialty 
trade activities generally needed in the construction of all types of buildings. 
Force account construction is construction work performed by an enterprise 
primarily engaged in some business other than construction for its own account, 
using employees of the enterprise. This activity is not included in the 
construction sector unless the construction work performed is the primary 
activity of a separate establishment of the enterprise. The installation and the 
ongoing repair and maintenance of telecommunications and utility networks is
135
excluded from construction when the establishments performing the work are 
not independent contractors. Although a growing proportion of this work is 
subcontracted to independent contractors in the Construction sector, the 
operating units of telecommunications and utility companies performing this 
work are included with the telecommunications or utility activities.
Printing and Related Support Activities
Industries in the Printing and Related Support Activities subsector print products, 
such as newspapers, books, labels, business cards, stationery, business forms, 
and other materials, and perform support activities, such as data imaging, 
platemaking services, and bookbinding. The support activities included here are 
an integral part of the printing industry, and a product (a printing plate, a bound 
book, or a computer disk or file) that is an integral part of the printing industry is 
almost always provided by these operations.
Processes used in printing include a variety of methods used to transfer an image 
from a plate, screen, film, or computer file to some medium, such as paper, 
plastics, metal, textile articles, or wood. The printing processes employed 
include, but are not limited to, lithographic, gravure, screen, flexographic, digital, 
and letterpress.
In contrast to many other classification systems that locate publishing of printed 
materials in manufacturing, NAICS classifies the publishing of printed products in 
Subsector 511, Publishing Industries (except Internet). Though printing and 
publishing are often carried out by the same enterprise (a newspaper, for
example), it is less and less the case that these distinct activities are carried out 
in the same establishment. When publishing and printing are done in the same 
establishment, the establishment is classified in Sector 51, Information, in the 
appropriate NAICS industry even if the receipts for printing exceed those for 
publishing.
This subsector includes printing on clothing because the production process for 
that activity is printing, not clothing manufacturing. For instance, the printing of 
T-shirts is included in this subsector. In contrast, printing on fabric (or grey 
goods) is not included. This activity is part of the process of finishing the fabric 
and is included in the NAICS Textile Mills subsector in Industry 31331, Textile and 
Fabric Finishing Mills.
Administrative and Support Services
Industries in the Administrative and Support Services subsector group 
establishments engaged in activities that support the day-to-day operations of 
other organizations. The processes employed in this sector (e.g., general 
management, personnel administration, clerical activities, cleaning activities) are 
often integral parts of the activities of establishments found in all sectors of the 
economy. The establishments classified in this subsector have specialization in 
one or more of these activities and can, therefore, provide services to clients in a 
variety of industries and, in some cases, to households. The individual industries 
of this subsector are defined on the basis of the particular process that they are 
engaged in and the particular services they provide.
Many of the activities performed in this subsector are ongoing routine support 
functions that all businesses and organizations must do and that they have 
traditionally done for themselves. Recent trends, however, are to contract or 
purchase such services from businesses that specialize in such activities and can, 
therefore, provide the services more efficiently.
The industries in this subsector cannot be viewed as strictly "support." The 
Travel Arrangement and Reservation Services industry group includes travel 
agents, tour operators, and providers of other travel arrangement services, such 
as hotel and restaurant reservations and arranging the purchase of tickets, 
serving many types of clients, including individual consumers. This group was 
placed in this subsector because the services are often of the "support" nature 
(e.g., travel arrangement) and businesses and other organizations are 
increasingly the ones purchasing such services.
The administrative and management activities performed by establishments in 
this sector are typically on a contract or fee basis. These activities may also be 
performed by establishments that are part of the company or enterprise. 
However, establishments involved in administering, overseeing, and managing 
other establishments of the company or enterprise are classified in Sector 55, 
Management of Companies and Enterprises. Establishments in Sector 55 
normally undertake the strategic and organizational planning and decision 
making role of the company or enterprise. Government establishments engaged
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in administering, overseeing, and managing governmental programs are 
classified in Sector 92, Public Administration.
5. Professional, Scientific, and Technical Services
The Professional, Scientific, and Technical Services sector comprises 
establishments that specialize in performing professional, scientific, and 
technical activities for others. These activities require a high degree of expertise 
and training. The establishments in this sector specialize according to expertise 
and provide these services to clients in a variety of industries and, in some cases, 
to households. Activities performed include: legal advice and representation; 
accounting, bookkeeping, and payroll services; architectural, engineering, and 
specialized design services; computer services; consulting services; research 
services; advertising services; photographic services; translation and 
interpretation services; veterinary services; and other professional, scientific, 
and technical services.
This sector excludes establishments primarily engaged in providing a range of 
day-to-day office administrative services, such as financial planning, billing and 
recordkeeping, personnel, and physical distribution and logistics. These 
establishments are classified in Sector 56, Administrative and Support and Waste 
Management and Remediation Services.
6. Miscellaneous Manufacturing
Industries in the Miscellaneous Manufacturing subsector make a wide range of 
products that cannot readily be classified in specific NAICS subsectors in
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manufacturing. Processes used by these establishments vary significantly, both 
among and within industries. For example, a variety of manufacturing processes 
are used in manufacturing sporting and athletic goods that include products such 
as tennis racquets and golf balls. The processes for these products differ from 
each other, and the processes differ significantly from the fabrication processes 
used in making dolls or toys, the melting and shaping of precious metals to make 
jewelry, and the bending, forming, and assembly used in making medical 
products. The industries in this subsector are defined by what is made rather 
than how it is made. Although individual establishments might be appropriately 
classified elsewhere in the NAICS structure, for historical continuity, these 
product-based industries were maintained. In most cases, no one process or 
material predominates for an industry.
Establishments in this subsector manufacture products as diverse as medical 
equipment and supplies, jewelry, sporting goods, toys, and office supplies. 
Machinery Manufacturing
Industries in the Machinery Manufacturing subsector create end products that 
apply mechanical force, for example, the application of gears and levers, to 
perform work. Some important processes for the manufacture of machinery are 
forging, stamping, bending, forming, and machining that are used to shape 
individual pieces of metal. Processes, such as welding and assembling are used 
to join separate parts together. Although these processes are similar to those 
used in metal fabricating establishments, machinery manufacturing is different
because it typically employs multiple metal forming processes in manufacturing 
the various parts of the machine. Moreover, complex assembly operations are 
an inherent part of the production process.
In general, design considerations are very important in machinery production. 
Establishments specialize in making machinery designed for particular 
applications. Thus, design is considered to be part of the production process for 
the purpose of implementing NAICS. The NAICS structure reflects this by defining 
industries and industry groups that make machinery for different applications. A 
broad distinction exists between machinery that is generally used in a variety of 
industrial applications (i.e., general purpose machinery) and machinery that is 
designed to be used in a particular industry (i.e., special purpose machinery). 
Three industry groups consist of special purpose machinery-Agricultural, 
Construction, and Mining Machinery Manufacturing; Industrial Machinery 
Manufacturing; and Commercial and Service Industry Machinery Manufacturing. 
The other industry groups make general-purpose machinery: Ventilation, 
Heating, Air-Conditioning, and Commercial Refrigeration Equipment 
Manufacturing; Metalworking Machinery Manufacturing; Engine, Turbine, and 
Power Transmission Equipment Manufacturing; and Other General Purpose 
Machinery Manufacturing.
8. Furniture and Related Product Manufacturing
Industries in the Furniture and Related Product Manufacturing subsector make 
furniture and related articles, such as mattresses, window blinds, cabinets, and
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fixtures. The processes used in the manufacture of furniture include the cutting, 
bending, molding, laminating, and assembly of such materials as wood, metal, 
glass, plastics, and rattan. However, the production process for furniture is not 
solely bending metal, cutting and shaping wood, or extruding and molding 
plastics. Design and fashion trends play an important part in the production of 
furniture. The integrated design of the article for both esthetic and functional 
qualities is also a major part of the process of manufacturing furniture. Design 
services may be performed by the furniture establishment's work force or may 
be purchased from industrial designers.
Furniture may be made of any material, but the most common ones used in 
North America are metal and wood. Furniture manufacturing establishments 
may specialize in making articles primarily from one material. Some of the 
equipment required to make a wooden table, for example, is different from that 
used to make a metal one. However, furniture is usually made from several 
materials. A wooden table might have metal brackets, and a wooden chair a 
fabric or plastics seat. Therefore, in NAICS, furniture initially is classified based on 
the type of furniture (application for which it is designed) rather than the 
material used. For example, an upholstered sofa is treated as household 
furniture, although it may also be used in hotels or offices.
When classifying furniture according to the component material from which it is 
made, furniture made from more than one material is classified based on the 
material used in the frame, or if there is no frame, the predominant component
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material. Upholstered household furniture (excluding kitchen and dining room 
chairs with upholstered seats) is classified without regard to the frame material. 
Kitchen or dining room chairs with upholstered seats are classified according to 
the frame material.
Furniture may be made on a stock or custom basis and may be shipped 
assembled or unassembled (i.e., knockdown). The manufacture of furniture parts 
and frames is included in this subsector.
Some of the processes used in furniture manufacturing are similar to processes 
that are used in other segments of manufacturing. For example, cutting and 
assembly occurs in the production of wood trusses that are classified in 
Subsector 321, Wood Product Manufacturing. However, the multiple processes 
that distinguish wood furniture manufacturing from wood product 
manufacturing warrant inclusion of wooden furniture manufacturing in the 
Furniture and Related Product Manufacturing subsector. Metal furniture 
manufacturing uses techniques that are also employed in the manufacturing of 
roll-formed products classified in Subsector 332, Fabricated Metal Product 
Manufacturing. The molding process for plastics furniture is similar to the 
molding of other plastics products. However, plastics furniture producing 
establishments tend to specialize in furniture.
NAICS attempts to keep furniture manufacturing together, but there are two 
notable exceptions: seating for transportation equipment and specialized 
hospital furniture (e.g., hospital beds and operating tables). These exceptions are
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related to the fact that some of the aspects of the production process for these 
products, primarily the design, are highly integrated with the other 
manufactured goods, namely motor vehicles and health equipment.
9. Computer and Electronic Product Manufacturing
Industries in the Computer and Electronic Product Manufacturing subsector 
group establishments that manufacture computers, computer peripherals, 
communications equipment, and similar electronic products, and establishments 
that manufacture components for such products. The Computer and Electronic 
Product Manufacturing industries have been combined in the hierarchy of NAICS 
because of the economic significance they have attained. Their rapid growth 
suggests that they will become even more important to the economies of all 
three North American countries in the future, and in addition their 
manufacturing processes are fundamentally different from the manufacturing 
processes of other machinery and equipment. The design and use of integrated 
circuits and the application of highly specialized miniaturization technologies are 
common elements in the production technologies of the computer and 
electronic subsector. Convergence of technology motivates this NAICS subsector. 
Digitalization of sound recording, for example, causes both the medium (the 
compact disc) and the equipment to resemble the technologies for recording, 
storing, transmitting, and manipulating data. Communications technology and 
equipment have been converging with computer technology. When 
technologically-related components are in the same sector, it makes it easier to
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adjust the classification for future changes, without needing to redefine its basic 
structure. The creation of the Computer and Electronic Product Manufacturing 
subsector assists in delineating new and emerging industries because the 
activities that will serve as the probable sources of new industries, such as 
computer manufacturing and communications equipment manufacturing, or 
computers and audio equipment, are brought together. As new activities 
emerge, they are less likely therefore, to cross the subsector boundaries of the 
classification.
10. Wood Product Manufacturing
Industries in the Wood Product Manufacturing subsector manufacture wood 
products, such as lumber, plywood, veneers, wood containers, wood flooring, 
wood trusses, manufactured homes (i.e., mobile homes), and prefabricated 
wood buildings. The production processes of the Wood Product Manufacturing 
subsector include sawing, planning, shaping, laminating, and assembling of wood 
products starting from logs that are cut into bolts, or lumber that then may be 
further cut, or shaped by lathes or other shaping tools. The lumber or other 
transformed wood shapes may also be subsequently planed or smoothed, and 
assembled into finished products, such as wood containers. The Wood Product 
Manufacturing subsector includes establishments that make wood products 
from logs and bolts that are sawed and shaped, and establishments that 
purchase sawed lumber and make wood products. With the exception of
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sawmills and wood preservation establishments, the establishments are grouped 
into industries mainly based on the specific products manufactured.
11. Electrical Equipment, Appliance, and Component Manufacturing
Industries in the Electrical Equipment, Appliance, and Component Manufacturing 
subsector manufacture products that generate, distribute and use electrical 
power. Electric Lighting Equipment Manufacturing establishments produce 
electric lamp bulbs, lighting fixtures, and parts. Household Appliance 
Manufacturing establishments make both small and major electrical appliances 
and parts. Electrical Equipment Manufacturing establishments make goods, such 
as electric motors, generators, transformers, and switchgear apparatus. Other 
Electrical Equipment and Component Manufacturing establishments make 
devices for storing electrical power (e.g., batteries), for transmitting electricity 




SOUTH CAROLINA ECONOMIC OVERVIEW 
South Carolina is the 40th largest state with an area of 30,060 square miles and 
an estimated population of 4,723,723 (Census of Bureau, 2013). The population per 
square mile is 153.9. The data shows that South Carolina's population has grown since 
2009. According to The South Carolina Department of Commerce Research Division 
(2010, p. 9), "Between 2000 and 2009 the population in South Carolina increased 13.4%, 
13.1% for the southeast, and 8.8% for the US". In 2012, South Carolina's unemployment 
rate was 8.6 ranking 10th highest among the other states (Bureau of Labor Statistics, 
2013). Compared to the national unemployment rate of 7.8, South Carolina has a higher 
rate than the national average. GSP for 2011 is $385,092, for 2010 is $378,131, for 2009 
is $368,963, for 2008 is $377,869 (Bureau of Economic Analysis, 2013). Personal income 
per capita in 2011 is $33,636, in 2010 is $32,193 (Federal Reserve Economic Data, 2013). 
Durable goods manufacturing contributed the most to the increase in the GSP (added 
.82%). "The large gains in the durable goods sector likely reflect rising output at BMW's 
operations in the Upstate and the ramp up of Boeing's operations in North Charleston" 
(Vitner & Silverman, 2013, p. 3). In addition to the durable goods, nondurable goods 
manufacturing, wholesale trade, government and real estate contributes to the GSP by 
a quarter of a percentage point (The South Carolina Department of Commerce Research 
Division, 2010). In 2012, the State added 32,400 jobs, and most of the jobs were in 
leisure and hospitality and retail trade. Construction firms added 4,200 jobs in 2012 as 
well (Feik, 2013).
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SOUTH CAROLINA 2012 ECONOMIC PROFILE
Area
■ 30,060 square miles 
Population




■ $176.2 billion 
Manufacturing
■ textile, clothing, wood, tourism 
Services




BEA Bureau of Economic Analysis
BLS Bureau of Labor Statistics
CAP Common Agricultural Policy
CBP County Business Patterns
EU European Union
FASA Federal Acquisition Streamlining Act
FECCAP Florida Energy and Climate Change Action Plan
GATT General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
GPA Government Procurement Agreement
GSP Gross State Product
IMPLAN Impact Analysis for Planning
MAPE Mean Absolute Percentage Error
NAICS The North American Industry Classification System
NASPO The National Association of State Procurement Officials
NIGP The National Institute of Governmental Purchasing
RCP Resident Contractor Preference
REND-PRODUCTP Resident Subcontractor Preference
REMI Regional Economic Model
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REMI PI+/ PI+ Regional Economic Model the Policy Insight Model
RIMS II Regional Input-Output Modeling System
RSCP Resident Subcontractor Preference
RSQE Research Seminar in Quantitative Economics
RVP Resident Vendor Preference
SCEPP South Carolina end-product preference
USEPP United States end-product preference
Wist Wist Office Products
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